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1. Introduction 
The Kyrgyz Republic declared independence from the Soviet Union on August 31, 1991. 
Starting from the period of Gorbachev’s reforms in 1980, the Kyrgyz society experienced more 
freedom in the cultural and political sphere (Borbieva, 2007:13). According to the ethnographer 
Mathijs Pelkmans, the Kyrgyz people defined the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
with the term bardak, which means chaos. This term encompasses the frustration of economic 
hardship and the difficult standards of living, but also the disillusionment with the secular Soviet 
ideology caused by the arrival of new ideas about religion (Pelkmans, 2009). New notions of 
Islam were introduced in Kyrgyzstan in the period after independence, which challenged the 
popular understanding of Islam that existed in Kyrgyzstan for ages. In this process, the state 
acted as a neutral observer that mainly monitored the emergence of new religious influences 
(Seifert & Usubaliev, 2011: 160). However, this policy changed when the situation in 
Afghanistan became more unstable and when organizations like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) became more active in Kyrgyzstan in the late 90’s. 
In this second stage, the state invested in a policy that was more restrictive towards foreign 
religious organizations. By monitoring religious groups and carrying out arrests of suspected 
members of potential extremist movements, the state tried to prevent Kyrgyzstani citizens from 
radicalizing. However, the results of this policy proved to be counterproductive (Khadimov, 
2017: 12). In order not to alienate the population that became increasingly Islamic, the 
government therefore decided from 2006 onwards to invest in a new policy and incorporate 
Islam as a core element in their national narrative. In this third stage ‘the state began to see 
Islam as an instrument it could use to strengthen its power, and the Muslim community as 
embodying a potentially powerful mechanism that it could use to mobilize the population to 
solve specific political problems’ (Siefert & Usabaliev, 2011: 161). 
By looking at the role of Islam in contemporary Kyrgyz society, it can be concluded that there 
are many political and religious forces that are trying to claim their place in the religious sphere. 
In this complex situation, the strategy of the Kyrgyz state is to instrumentalize the notion of 
Islam to promote its own status and to legitimize their control of the religious sphere. In its 
promotion of Islam, the state is building on the historical notions of Islam. According to scholars, 
an important characteristic of Kyrgyz Islam is that pre-Islamic influences have had an effect on 
the way that Kyrgyz practice Islam. Louw writes that ‘the Kyrgyz have long had the reputation 
of not being very religious – of not being ‘real’ Muslims, and of practicing a form of Islam which 
is mixed with pagan, pre-Islamic, animistic or shamanistic elements (...) (Louw, 2013: 517). 
This falls in line with many Muslim communities in Central Asia, who have also used pre-
Islamic religious practices to create narratives that could explain their origin and the history of 
their communities. In the navigation of their Islamic identity, the practicing of religious rituals 
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based on textual sources, like the Qu’ran, was less important. Instead, many Central Asians 
based their Islamic identity on a set of Islamic practices mixed with a set of local norms and 
values (Khalid, 2007: 21-22). Ultimately, the branch of Islam that became the most popular in 
Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Central Asia, was the Hanafi madhab. Being one the four schools 
(madhhabs) in Sunni Islam, the Hanafi school is known for its rationalistic approach of Islam 
and its tolerance to pre-Islamic traditions and therefore ‘helped to escape tensions between 
the new and old systems of beliefs’ (Naumkin, 2005: 7). In this way, the local norms and values 
of the Kyrgyz tribes were incorporated in the Islamic tradition and thus became an inseparable 
element of a localized form of Islam in Kyrgyzstan (Ashymov, 2003: 136).  
 
McBrien and Pelkmans write that the new Kyrgyz constitution and government policies after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union provided religious freedom and opportunities for the influx of 
missionaries to Kyrgyzstan (McBrien & Pelkmans, 2009: 88). Christian groups have been 
actively involved in missionary work and proselytizing people to Christianity, while Islamic 
organizations from Muslim states like Saudi-Arabia, the Gulf States and Turkey have 
supported the Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan in the training of Islamic clergy and the building of Islamic 
schools and mosques. Furthermore, by providing funding for Islamic literature and 
scholarships for promising Kyrgyz students, these states have contributed to the rise of Islamic 
presence in society. Heyat mentions that number of mosques rose from 39 mosques in 1991 
to 2000 in 2001 (2004: 276). The role of Islam became more important in the period after 
independence with the rise of Islamic literature in the public sphere and the emergence of 
Islamic religious lessons in school and Islamic programs on radio and television (Heyat, 2004). 
 
The aim of this thesis is to research how the government is perceiving the increasing 
Islamization as a threat to the ‘traditional’ form of Islam that is present in Kyrgyzstan, and how 
it is using the notion of religion to create a national identity that could ‘restore the order’ of the 
‘nation-state’ (Biard, 2017: 111). As literature shows, much has already been written about the 
relationship between Islam and the state in Central Asia by academics, policy makers and 
journalists. A majority of this content is, however, focused on the topic of extremism, 
radicalization and Islamic terrorism. Although it is important to research radicalization 
processes and anti-terrorism policies, many articles that are focused on extremism are often 
oversimplifying the role of religious revivalism and role of Islam in society. According to 
Montgomery, policy papers that cover Islam in Central Asia are mostly interested in the few 
radicalized Muslims than in the story of the rest of Muslim population. In this way, the opinion 
of the majority of the population is often underrepresented (Montgomery, 2014). As scholars 
argue, the topic of Islam in Central Asia is much more complex than some articles portray it to 
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be, which also underlines the necessity to perform ethnographic research to demonstrate the 
opinion of the population (Artman, 2016b; Montgomery, 2016).  
In an attempt to understand the impact of both political and religious forces on the Kyrgyz 
population, the aim of this thesis is to analyze how the state is promoting Islam and their 
religious policies and if the perceptions of the population align with the arguments that are 
mentioned in state discourse. The central research question of this thesis is therefore: do the 
perceptions of students align with arguments in state discourse regarding the role of Islam in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan? In order to answer this question, this thesis will look at state policy 
from a top-down perspective and from a bottom-up perspective. By using this two-pronged 
approach, this thesis will combine desk-analysis of state discourse with field research in 
Bishkek. The first approach is to look at the way that the Kyrgyz state has emphasized 
traditional aspects of Islam and the historical connection with Kyrgyz ethno-national identity in 
state discourse. By looking at both state policy, which is the Concept of the State Policy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic in the Religious Sphere for 2014-2020, and state narrative, which are public 
remarks by government representatives, this research will look at four major themes in state 
discourse that promote government policies in the religious sphere. The second approach is 
to analyze if the perceptions of Kyrgyz students align with the view that is promoted in state 
discourse. By interviewing twenty-four students that are studying at three significantly different 
universities in Bishkek, this research attempts to provide an insight on how students in Bishkek 
are currently constructing their Islamic identity and how they are perceiving the role of the state 
in the religious sphere. Due to the limited time of this research, only twenty-four students could 
be interviewed in this research. However, looking at the goal of this research, a small sample 
size provides more opportunity to focus on the personal experience of students and offer them 
more freedom to share their opinions. 
Since there was not one framework that could be applied to compare both the analysis of state 
discourse as the results of the interview, research draws on a variety of different frameworks. 
In this way, research for this thesis can be defined as exploratory research. By applying the 
theoretical concepts of the legitimization of religion by governments (Peyrouse, 2007; Biard, 
2017; Omelicheva, 2017), believing and belonging (McBrien, 2017) and balanced existence 
(Louw, 2013), this research aims to both analyze state discourse and remarks of students and 
explain if students are perceiving the role of Islam and the role of the government in a similar 
way as the government does. Ultimately, by analyzing both the top-down perspective and 
bottom-up perspective, this thesis will demonstrate that there two major angles visible in the 
students’ view on Islam. The first angle shows that the majority of students are voicing similar 
arguments as state discourse and thus perceive the government also as the responsible actor 
to safeguard Kyrgyz traditions and the security of the country. However, as the second angle 
 
8 
will point out, students are increasingly being influenced by new interpretations of Islam which 
also leads them to reconstruct their Islamic identity in a different way than government 
discourse promotes. This shows that, although the perceptions of students for the most part 
align with state discourse, external discourse are able to influence the perceptions of students 
and change their view on the connection between Kyrgyz identity and Islam.  
It is important to note that there is a clear distinction between the word ‘Kyrgyz’ and 
Kyrgyzstani’. The first definition defines nationality while the latter defines citizenship. For 
example, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan who is ethnic Uzbek can be defined as a Kyrgyzstani but not 
a Kyrgyz. Since only ethnic Kyrgyz were interviewed in this research and ethno-national 
identity proves to be an important element in this research, this thesis will mostly speak of the 
Kyrgyz students. When writing about the government, scholars have both used ‘Kyrgyz’ and 
‘Kyrgyzstani’. This thesis will use the term Kyrgyz when referring to government and ethnic 
identity and Kyrgyzstani when talking about the whole population.  
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2. Islam in Kyrgyzstan: A Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, a growing number of scholars have become 
interested in the topic of identity politics and Islamization in Central Asia. In this process, 
academics and policy makers have looked at the political development of the individual Central 
Asian nation states and analyzed how Islam is used by the states to construct a national 
narrative. Similarly, the topic of Islamization in Central Asia has been the subject of many 
academic articles and policy papers. Since the research of thesis will look at the role of Islam 
in Kyrgyzstan from a top-down and a bottom-up perspective, this chapter will provide an 
overview of the growing body of literature on identity politics and an overview of the body of 
literature on the evolving Islamic religious orthodoxy. In this way, the literature review will show 
the most important concepts and frameworks that are used to analyze the empirical research.  
 
2.2 Government Policy 
2.2.1 Identity Politics and the Creation of an Ethno-National Identity 
The function of religion as an element of Kyrgyz national identity became important during the 
post-Soviet period when the Kyrgyz government began to promote religion as an essential part 
of the Kyrgyz ethnic identity (Radford, 2014: 24-25; Biard, 2017: 112). These religious policies 
draw on the ‘the interrelated processes of ethnicization and folklorization of religion’ during the 
Soviet period, that, according to Pelkmans, ‘are crucial for understanding the twists and turns 
of religious change after the implosion of communist ideology’ (2009:6). Soviet religious 
policies contributed to the merging of a religious and ethno-national identity, which eventually 
led to fact that many post-Soviet citizens aligned their religion with their ethnic identity. In this 
sense, according to McBrien, religion was not a threat to the secular Soviet state since religion 
was transformed by Soviet policies to become an element of national belonging. In this way, 
McBrien writes that religion functioned in cooperation with the secular state, and that even ‘this 
notion of religion was necessary for the power and being of the Soviet secular state’ since it 
could be used to support Soviet measures (2017: 9).  
 
According to some scholars, the contemporary Central Asian states created an ‘official’ form 
of Islam in their nationalist ideologies and used it as legitimization for their state control over 
religious affairs (Pelkmans, 2009, Biard, 2017; Omelicheva, 2017). In this process, ‘Central 
Asian authorities recognize and emphasize some religious elements by elevating them to 
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markers of identity and state, but also subordinating them to the goals of the state’ (Peyrouse, 
2007: 102). In the case of Kyrgyzstan, Nasritdinov and Esenamanova argue, the Kyrgyz 
Constitution defines Kyrgyzstan as a secular country that is based on neutral views. However, 
they identify a government policy whereby the previous government is ‘promoting a locally 
appropriate model of Islam that does not contradict local customs and traditions and is modern 
at the same time’ (Nasritdinov & Esenamanova, 2017: 224). In this approach, the Kyrgyz state 
is using Islamic symbols to justify political measures, to mobilize the Islamic population and to 
create a moral framework that can be used to legitimize cultural and religious approaches 
(Artman, 2016: 253). According to Biard, the notion of religion is used by the state to ‘sanctify 
the nation’ and for the ‘consolidation of the nation-state’ (Biard, 2017: 112). 
Due to the fact that the state uses Islam to legitimize their political measures, the state also 
perceives the influence of Islamist groups in Kyrgyzstan as a ‘potential ideological rival and 
factor of destabilization’ (Biard, 2010: 325). The Kyrgyz government is therefore distinguishing 
between a moderate form of Islam and a radicalized form of Islam in their state narrative. By 
promoting a moderate Islam as the national religion and condemning radical Islam as a 
negative, foreign influence, the state tries to differentiate between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ form of 
Islam (Abashin, 2012: 160). The state views ‘good’ versions of Islam as religion that supports 
the national values and traditions of the country and, while ‘bad’ versions of Islam try to 
undermine this and should therefore be banned (Louw, 2013: 515) Biard writes that ‘in the 
case of Kyrgyzstan, ‘good’ Islam corresponds to a supposed Kyrgyzness and serves as a 
vehicle of the nation and its supposed uniqueness (…) (2017: 113). For the state, it is therefore 
important to make sure that a form of Islam is practiced in Kyrgyzstan that is compatible with 
the laws of the secular state. According to McBrien, ‘Since independence, the Kyrgyz 
government has attempted to control definitions of Muslimness to ensure that ‘tolerant’, 
‘democratic’, and ‘moderate’ interpretations of Islam are practiced in its borders. In doing so, it 
promotes a vision of Muslimness consonant with that of the Soviet era, which was in essence 
an element of national identity’ (McBrien, 2017:85).  
Although the Kyrgyz state is suspicious of foreign influences, ‘un-traditional’ Islamic 
movements have been enjoying relative freedom in Kyrgyzstan in comparison to other Central 
Asian states like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. According to Hann & Pelkmans, freedom of 
religion have led to the fact that many Islamic movements have been able to gain more ground 
in Kyrgyzstan (2009). An important example in this process is the influence of Islamist group 
Tablighi Al-Jamaat on Kyrgyz society. While being banned in other Central Asian states, this 
organization can operate without restrictions in Kyrgyzstan due to its a-political nature (Artman 
2016: 4). The organization is popular in Kyrgyzstan because it is promoting an understandable, 
text-based form of Islam. However, even today, some politicians in Kyrgyzstan are suspicious 
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of its activities and are still considering banning the organization (Artman, 2016: 4-5). While 
literature often portray major Islamist groups in Kyrgyzstan, like Tablighi Al-Jamaat, Hizb ut-
Tahrir and others, as violent Islamist groups, not all of them are promoting violence and the 
violent groups have very little impact on Kyrgyz Muslims (Heathershaw & Montgomery, 2014; 
Artman, 2016). In their Chatham House policy paper on the ‘myth of radicalization in Central 
Asia’, Heathershaw and Montgomery critique the fact that it has become custom in literature 
and government narratives to connect Islamization to radicalization. According to them, Central 
Asian states have used the threat of Islamization and radicalization as legitimation for their 
policies. They identify an increased level of public piety but argue that there is no proof that 
this also leads to radicalization among Muslims (Heathershaw and Montgomery, 2014: 7).  
2.3 Contemporary Islamization 
According to literature about Islam in Central Asia, the level of religiosity among Muslims in 
Kyrgyzstan is rising rapidly in the past two decades. Several studies suggest that an increasing 
number of people are identifying themselves as Muslim and are participating in Islamic 
practices (Ro’I and Wainer, 2009; Louw, 2013; Pelkmans, 2017). In a recently published article, 
public opinion surveys that were conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 2007 and 2012 show that almost 
95 percent of the Kyrgyzstani population identify themselves as Muslim in 2012, that the 
percentage of weekly attendance of religious services more than doubled (112 percent 
increase), and those engaging in daily prayer grew by 62 percent from 2007 to 2012 (Junisbai 
et al, 2017). This revival of Islam is also visible in the public sphere where we can see that the 
number of mosques has grown from 39 in 1991 to 2,362 mosques in 2013. In his article about 
the Islamization process in Kyrgyzstan, Jalil mentions how more Kyrgyz students are studying 
at Kyrgyz Islamic faculties and are going abroad for Islamic education, how the halal food 
industry is growing rapidly and how a rising number of Kyrgyz Muslims are performing the hajj 
to Mecca (Jalil, 2017: 9).  
 
2.3.1 Tradition and National Identity 
One of the first studies that tried to identify the growing role of Islam in the Kyrgyz society was 
the paper ‘Re-Islamization in Kyrgyzstan: gender, poverty and the moral dimension’ by Farideh 
Heyat (2004). Heyat explains in her study how Islamic practices gained popularity among the 
population in the south of Kyrgyzstan and how the number of mosques and madrassas grew 
rapidly. In this Islamization process, Heyat identified the influence of foreign countries, who 
promote a different kind of Islam then the ‘syncretism of nomadic beliefs and customs’ that 
was common in Kyrgyzstan (2004: 276). The impact of these foreign influences on the identity 
of Kyrgyz Muslims is discussed by Borbieva (2009), who argues that Islamic ideas conveyed 
by translated books, Islamic institutions and websites alter the local interpretations of Islam. 
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According to her, these ideas reconstruct ‘the issue of identity, comprising questions of 
religious authority (Who can speak for Islam?), ethnicity (Does Islam accommodate the idea 
of “Muslim by birth”?), and political allegiance (Does participation in political Islamic groups 
make one Muslim? Can one be Muslim and participate in a secular state?)’ (Borbieva: 2009: 
14).   
In this process of new emerging religious ideas, the role of local Islamic tradition and their 
connection to the national identity of Kyrgyzstan is negotiated and debated by members of the 
community. Concluding from interviews with religious leaders and government representatives, 
Artman describes how ‘national traditions have […] become a site of contestation between 
Muslims articulating different understandings of what constitutes “real” Islam’ (2015: 4). 
According to Artman, the influence of Islamic movements like Tablighi Al-Jamaat has led to a 
public debate about the practices of local Islam. Followers of these Islamic movements have 
been critical of local customs, like visiting shrines (mazars) and visiting healers, and deemed 
them ‘un-Islamic’. This standpoint is also supported by many other Kyrgyzstani Muslims who 
are convinced that people who practice local customs don’t have enough knowledge about 
Islam. In contrast to this, Artman identifies the fact that many ‘traditional’ Muslims, including 
government representatives, are cautious about the viewpoint of the ‘purist’ Muslims and are 
worried that ‘what is considered to be “foreign” Islam is incompatible with the traditional bases 
of Kyrgyz national identity’ (Artman, 2015: 2).  
2.3.2 Believing and Belonging 
In the basis, these developments show that new purist forms of Islam are challenging the basic 
notions of Kyrgyz national Islam that are strongly connected with Kyrgyz ethnic identity. This 
national form of Islam is not homogenous but composed of multiple different interpretations of 
Islam. As Borbieva argues, Kyrgyz Muslims have long based their understanding of Islam on 
collective traditions and rituals that have been carried from generation to generation. But these 
new ‘foreign’ forms of Islam are more text-based and therefore ‘challenges the notion of 
Muslim-by-birth, asserting that ‘Muslimness’ is not primordial, inborn quality but a state of being 
that is constructed (and reconstructed) through action’, which also affect their ideas about the 
meaning of Islam (Borbieva, 2009:20-21). This transition, where Muslimness is no longer 
understood as an ethno-national identity but as an identity that is more focused on action, is 
also the central theme in McBrien’s recently published book ‘From Believing to Belonging’. 
Based on historical literature and her extensive fieldwork among the Muslims population in the 
southern Kyrgyz city Bazaar-Korgon, McBrien constructed the framework of believing and 
belonging, wherein she argues that there is a shift in religious identity among Kyrgyz Muslims 
from an ethno-national notion of Muslimness that is more focused on belonging to a liberal 
interpretation of Muslimness that is focused on believing. In her book, McBrien demonstrates 
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how Muslims in in Bazaar-Kargon were gaining more knowledge about Islam from outside 
sources, like books and audio recordings, and how this contributed to a new notion of 
Muslimness that is primarily a ‘faith-oriented identity’ (2017: 48). For Muslims who perceived 
their Islamic identity as a form of belonging, these new forms of Islam were received with 
suspicion since ‘it invalidated their everyday mode of religious and ethical life’ and it ‘negated 
the idea of Muslimness as belonging’ (McBrien, 2017: 174). In this way, these new notions of 
Islam also invalidated the definitions of Islam that are connected to national identity and can 
thus be seen as processes that are challenging the form of Islam that the Kyrgyz state have 
been promoting and the authority of the Kyrgyz state itself (McBrien, 2017: 57- 58). 
2.3.3 Generational Difference 
In this process, there is a considerable difference between the generation that grew up after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the generation that grew up during the Soviet period. 
Public opinion surveys by Ro’I and Wainer (2009) and Junisbai et al. (2017) show that 
especially young people are starting to practice a more non-traditional form of Islam. According 
to Myrzabekova, ‘the youth of Kyrgyzstan have an interest in Islam and eagerly embraces 
religious ideology, whereas older people who grew in secular Soviet Era are more resistant. It 
is hard to change them, whereas youth is susceptible and tends to normalize the Islamization 
process ‘(Myrzabekova, 2014: 8). Still, for many young people it can be difficult to fully devote 
themselves to Islam. According to Louw (2013), many young people are trying to balance live 
their lives between to Islamic rules they have learned by external sources and the Kyrgyz 
traditions that they have learned from their parents out of fear of being described as ‘fanatics’. 
In her article about the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam in Kyrgyzstan, Louw provides 
the example of Asel, a Kyrgyz student in Bishkek who wants to learn more about Islam. Louw 
writes: ‘she [Asel] persistently tries to strike some kind of balance, pursuing her interest in 
Islam and in becoming a better Muslim, seeking to behave according to the rules of Islam as 
she knows them from the mosque, but also to behave according to the standards of acceptable 
behavior characteristic of society as such and, in particular, her older family members’ 
understanding of Muslimness (…) ’ (2013: 521). Since many young people in Kyrgyzstan want 
to be committed to both sides, they often are forced to weigh the different elements against 
each other. This attempt to both follow the rules of Islam and respect the tradition of the elder 
generation is what Louw defines as a ‘balanced existence’. In their attempt to not only follow 
‘blind belief or cynical pragmatism’, young people are therefore searching for the middle road 
(Louw, 2013: 522). 
McBrien also provides an important example in her book to show the difference between the 
‘Soviet’ generation and the ‘post-Soviet’ generation. According to McBrien, the young 
generation is interested in attending and organizing wedding parties, because weddings offers 
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them a safe space where they could learn more about Islam beyond the control of their parents. 
However, the elder generation ‘experienced the weddings as an implicit threat to their way of 
life and perhaps ultimately the legitimacy of their control and authority over their children and 
their community’ (2017: 78). The difference between believing and belonging is therefore also 
a difference between a post-Soviet generation that welcomes new interpretations of Islam and 
a Soviet generation that is afraid that ‘these interpretations would undermine the most basic 
ideas, practices, and institutions of their Kyrgyzness’ (McBrien, 2017: 77). In distinguishing 
between a ‘bad’ form of Islam and a ‘good’ form of Islam, an important difference between 
these generations are the sources of legitimacy and authority. Concluding from years of field- 
and data research in Kyrgyzstan, Montgomery argues that the specific way that Kyrgyz 
Muslims view their Muslim identity and the importance of Islamic practices are dictated by the 
way that they learn about Islam. Although the medium of religious knowledge can change over 
time, before it could be collective traditions and now videos on Youtube, the issue of legitimacy 
and authority remains important (2016: 161). In this way, Montgomery argues, these sources 
eventually also influence the way that Kyrgyz Muslims think about their tradition and their own 
ethno-national identity (Montgomery, 2016: 160).  
2.4 Conclusion 
Concluding, the literature mentioned in this chapter provides clarity on how the state is using 
Islamic symbols and Islamic traditions in their national discourses to construct an ethno-
national identity. Simultaneously, literature shows that a rising number of young people in 
Kyrgyzstan are constructing and reconstructing their ideas about Muslimness by new sources 
that are shaping and transforming their religious and ethno-national identity. However, as was 
mentioned in the introduction, many articles are concerned with the political implications of 
Islamization and are mostly focused on the topic of security and radicalism. As David 
Montgomery argues, there is a gap between the way that policy papers and ethnographic 
papers write about Islam in Central Asia. He argues that ‘the policy frame is more concerned 
with the few Muslims labelled as ‘threats’ than it is by the majority of the population because 
the extremes make better stories and are the concerns that policies seek to change’. However, 
according to him, the ethnographic perspective can sometimes be too subjective and too 
biased (Montgomery, 2014). This shows that there is a gap in literature when it comes to 
research that could provide understanding on the creation of state policies on religion as well 
as the Islamic identity of Kyrgyz people. Similar to what Mongomery argues, this thesis 
therefore emphasizes the need to compare the top down perspective with the bottom up 
perspective to bridge the gap in literature. It is necessary to look at the way that the state have 
promoted Islam for the construction of a national identity and how the views of young people 
on Islam are aligning with these state discourses. 
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3. State Discourse on Religion   
 
3.1 Introduction 
As literature showed, the Kyrgyz government has mobilized the notion of Islam in order to 
promote national security and national ideology. Official state documents have emphasized 
the unique position of Islam and government representatives have promoted Islam in public 
remarks. At the same time, the state is also suspicious of public religiosity. It views foreign 
Islamic discourses and practices as unwanted influences that could lead to instability. The 
state has therefore invested in a state discourse that is aiming to distinguish between a ‘safe’ 
and ‘moderate’ form of Islam that is compatible with Kyrgyz national identity and a ‘radical’ or 
‘extremist’ form of Islam that could threaten this identity. In order to understand how the 
government instrumentalized Islam in its state discourse, this chapter will analyze two main 
elements of this discourse: state policy and state narrative. Although literature has used these 
definitions for a wide range of different concepts, this thesis defines state policy as the official 
government line in state documents and state narrative as the official government line that 
government representatives and representatives of government voice in public remarks. State 
discourse, in this view, is defined as the combination of state policy and state discourse. By 
looking at both perspectives, the analysis of state discourse thus does not limit itself by only 
looking at official state documents but also provides a broader picture by incorporating state 
narrative. 
 
First, state policy will be analyzed by looking at the key policy document on religion: the 
Concept of the State Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Religious Sphere for 2014-2020, 
which from now on will be called the Concept of State Policy in the Religious Sphere. The 
government introduced this concept during a meeting of the Security Council in 2014. In this 
concept, the state promotes the importance of ‘traditional Kyrgyz Islam’ and underlines the 
need for “the conservation and development of national cultures, language, traditional spiritual 
values of the Kyrgyz and in general the peoples of Kyrgyzstan, and therefore doesn’t allow 
their opposition by any religious value” (As cited by Nyatakicia, 2016: 22).  According to local 
scholar Esenamanova, this policy was created by the Kyrgyz state due to the ‘threat for the 
loss of national identity under the influence of foreign ideologies’ and ‘the threat of an 
ideological split in Kyrgyz society’ (Esenamanova, 2015). The Concept of State Policy in the 
Religious Sphere therefore functions as a good example to analyze state policy. Secondly, 
state narrative can be identified in the public remarks of political leaders who promote ‘correct’ 
Islamic knowledge and practices in public remarks. Likewise, government representatives from 
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institutions like the State Commission for Religious Affairs and the Muftiate are expected to 
voice the same state narrative. The State Commission for Religious Affairs (SCRA) is a secular 
institution that is operating under the jurisdiction of the president of the Kyrgyz Republic. The 
institution is responsible for registering religious groups, providing licenses and monitoring 
organizations (State Department, 2014: 2). The Spiritual Administration of Kyrgyzstan, better 
known as Muftiate, is an independent religious institution that is responsible for issuing out 
fatwas, educating people about the right Islamic practices and supervising the religious 
institutions (Wolters, 2014: 11). The Muftiate is officially not state controlled but an independent 
institution. However, scholars (Artmans, 2016b, Lenz-Rayman, 2014; Biard, 2017) argue that 
that the state influences the activities of the Muftiate and that ‘religious leaders are used by the 
government to promote state policies among the population’ (Lenz-Rayman, 2014: 197-198). 
 
After analyzing both state policy and state narrative, this thesis has identified four major themes 
in state discourse; the glorification of the Hanafi school of Islam, the condemnation of foreign 
Islamic dress, the use of a ‘discourse of danger’ to condemn foreign form of Islam and the 
need to invest in religious education to prevent extremism. In both the Concept of State Policy 
in the Religious Sphere as public remarks from government representatives, these four issues 
proved to be reoccurring arguments in government rhetoric. This chapter will analyze these 
four themes to show how the Kyrgyz state has been using the notions of a ‘traditional Kyrgyz 
Islam’ and ‘extremist Islam’ to create legitimacy for government policy and to promote a 
localized form of Islam that that does not contradict local traditions and local dress, but is 
compliant with secular laws. 
 
3.2 Traditional Kyrgyz Islam 
One of the main principles that the state is trying to promote in the Concept of State Policy in 
the Religious Sphere is the strong connection between the Kyrgyz ethno-national identity and 
the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. This legal school is based on the legislation of Abu 
Hanafi, and has been the dominant school in Central Asia for ages. According to scholars of 
Islam, the Hanafi school is known as the most liberal legal school of Islam because the legal 
doctrines are more flexible than in other Islamic schools and it also provides more freedom for 
practicing local customs (Warren, 2013). By underling the importance of the Hanafi school and 
by focusing on the moderate and tolerant aspects of the Hanafi school, the government tries 
to promote a traditional yet modern kind of Islam in state policy. This can be identified in the 
Concept of State Policy in the Religious Sphere, which states that: 
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‘The state will create conditions for the strengthening and development of a traditional 
and moderate form of Sunni Islam on the basis of the Hanafi religio-legal school and 
the Maturidi creed. This school, which is shared by the majority of the citizens of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, has a historically proven capacity for tolerance, goodneighborliness, 
and respect in conditions of ethnic and religious diversity’ (As cited by Artman, 2016a: 
262). 
 
Many influential religious leaders in the country, like the theologian Kadyr Malikov, have 
cooperated closely with the government on issues related to religion and voiced their support 
to a notion of religion that is based on a ‘traditional form of Islam’. It is important to underline 
though, that in this sense, ‘traditional’ is not understood as a form of Islam that is opposed to 
liberal and modern values. In contrary, the government is only using the definition of ‘traditional’ 
to emphasize the historical connection between Kyrgyz tradition and Islam. In their attempt to 
differentiate between a Kyrgyz form of Islam and foreign forms of Islam, the government is 
actually promoting the progressive and liberal values of ‘traditional’ Islam. According to Artman, 
Malikov understands the notion of ‘traditional form of Islam’ as a ‘normative definition of Islam’ 
that could be used to identity foreign influences. Islam is,  in this sense,  perceived as a religion 
that is aligned with the state and with Kyrgyz national culture, while foreign forms of Islam are 
described as ‘fundamentally alien and hostile’ and ‘as a threat to Kyrgyz national identity’ 
(Artman, 2016a: 263).  
3.2.1 Tolerance towards Local Traditions  
Government representatives often emphasize the unique tolerant nature of the Hanafi school 
in order to demonstrate that this form of Islam is not in conflict with the pre-Islamic local 
traditions of Kyrgyzstan and the traditional nomadic customs. All of the three former presidents 
of the Kyrgyz Republic have spoken out in favor of a moderate form of Islam and underlined 
that Kyrgyz Islam is based on tolerance instead of extremism. The first president, Askar 
Akayaev said: ‘Our brand of Islam absorbed many of the cultural traditions of the peoples in 
the region (As cited by McBrien and Pelkmans, 2008: 91). The second president, Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev, defined Islam as a tolerant and peaceful religion and said that ‘true Islam has nothing 
to with religious extremism’ (As cited by McGlinchey 2009: 18). The previous president 
Almazbek Atambayev has often underlined the importance of the Hanafi school of Islam and 
its connection to a traditional form of Kyrgyz Islam. On multiple occasions, Atambayev 
underlined the fact that the Hanafi school is a branch of Islam that respected religious diversity 
and tolerance. In an interview with a Kyrgyzstani newspaper, Atambayev explained that ‘the 
Kyrgyz people were never religious fanatics. That our forefathers belonged to the Hanafi 
madhab was not a coincidence. I would like to stress one feature of the Hanafi madhab. In 
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modern parlance: it was tolerant’ (As cited by Artman, 2016b, 6). In a speech that Atamabayev 
gave during a conference in Bishkek last September, he underlined the significance of the 
Hanafi school and the need to ‘preserve’ traditional culture: 
  
‘The Islamic school, that has developed here - the Hanafi madhhab, the Sufi teachings, 
do not oppose the doctrinal Islam to local tradition. (…) At one time, our ancestors 
accepted Islam also because it did not contradict the local customs and traditions, the 
worldview of nomads. Today it has become an integral part of our traditional culture 
(…). The current wave of extremism and terrorism, under guise of religious slogans, 
can be overcome through the strengthening of national states, the preservation of their 
own culture, language and identity. Moreover, the way of life, manners, clothing and 
culture of Muslims of other countries, should not be imposed, under the guise of Islam. 
Such attempts can lead to divisions in society, increased tension and conflicts’ 
(Atambayev, 2017).  
Concluding from this remark, Atambayev condemns the ‘dogmatic’ forms of Islam that try to 
abandon the national traditions, language and culture.  He clearly draws a line between a 
Kyrgyz form of Islam that is rooted in local (pre-Islamic) customs and traditions and a form of 
foreign Islam that is trying to impose foreign traditions and clothing. According to him, the 
‘strengthening of national states’ and the ‘preservation of their own culture, language and 
identity’ is needed to put a hold to these foreign influences (Atambayev, 2017). 
3.3 Religious Clothing 
One important theme that is often underlined in state discourse is the dangerous potential of 
foreign Islamic dress. The state is highly critical about the increasing popularity of the hijab, 
while civil society groups try to promote the rights of women who are starting to cover their 
heads. However, although there is still a lot of public discussion about the wearing of the hijab, 
religious clothes are not banned in Kyrgyzstan. This stands in contrast to Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan, where the government promotes traditional headscarves but prohibits the ‘“foreign” 
fashions of wearing the hijab’ (Lenz-Rayman, 2016: 187). In Kyrgyzstan, the situation is more 
complicated. While the government provides freedom for citizens to wear whatever they want, 
they are also actively trying to promote Kyrgyz national dress and propagating against ‘foreign’ 
Islamic dress. During a press conference in 2014 where the Concept of State Policy in the 
Religious Sphere was introduced, Atambayev underlined the need to protect the national 
identity. He says: 
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‘If we do not pay attention to that [foreign influences, MK], we will gradually lose our 
national identity. If someone imposes the so-called Islamic clothing and hijab on us, 
there will be a time when those who wear traditional or comfortable contemporary 
clothing will be called unbelievers. In the Holy Quran there is no concept about what 
clothing is Islamic and what is not. Islam only requires clean and neat dress’ (As cited 
by Nasritdinov and Esenamanova, 2017: 224). 
One of the clearest examples that demonstrated how government is trying to discourage 
Kyrgyzstani citizens from wearing Islamic dress were the government-sponsored billboards 
that were installed in Bishkek in the summer of 2016. These billboards showed a picture of 
women in traditional Kyrgyz clothes, next to two pictures of women in closed veils. The text 
under the pictures read: ‘My poor people! Where are we heading to?’ The billboards were 
installed by the spiritual foundation Yiman, an organization that was created by Atamabyev, 
and supported with financial donations from the presidential administration of Atambayev 
(Freedom House, 2017; Nasritdinov and Esenamanova, 2017: 218). The billboards caused for 
a lot of commotion. People were discussing the billboards on social media, religious institutions 
condemned the effort and civil society groups accused the government of limiting the freedom 
of religion. In reaction to this criticism, government representatives supported the billboards in 
public statements. According to Orozbek Moldaliev, the head of the State Committee on 
Religious Affairs, the banners were meant to show that Kyrgyz women normally never wear 
black (Nasritdinov and Esenamanova, 2017: 218).  Atambayev remarked during a press 
conference that ‘woman in miniskirts don’t become suicidebombers. (…) Our women have 
been wearing miniskirts since 1950s, and they never thought about wearing an explosive belt’. 
In his statement, Atambayev specifically used the potential danger of a terrorist attack warn 
against the rising popularity of Islamic dress. According to him, Islamic clothes could influence 
people to become more radical and eventually more dangerous (BBC News, 2016). According 
to Freedom House, ‘Atambayev said that he would order similar banners to be displayed 
around the country as a way to resist the “imposition of foreign culture”’. Eventually, the 
continued criticism from civil society organizations led to the removal of the billboards (2016). 
3.4 Religious Extremism 
Atambayev’s remarks about the potential radicalization of people who wear Islamic dress is a 
good example of a state narrative that is using notions of radicalization and extremism to 
condemn more purist forms of Islam. Similar to other Central Asian states, the Kyrgyz 
government instrumentalizes notions of extremism and radicalism and portray themselves as 
the defenders of a democratic and secular society while condemning new forms of religiosity 
as threats to the state (Biard, 2017: 114). In state narrative, Islamization has often been 
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appointed as the main indicator that the level of extremism is rising. Heathershaw and 
Montgomery define this approach as a ‘discourse of danger’. According to them, this discourse 
claims that an increased level of religiosity in the public sphere will lead to radicalization and 
eventually to a form of political Islam that can rebel against the state. In this, ‘[t]he direct claim 
of this danger discourse is that Islam, to the extent it is political, is a threat to the social order 
that the state is purported to maintain’ (Montgomery & Heathershaw, 2016: 192). In reality, 
violent acts in Kyrgyzstan are rarely inspired by Islamic ideologies and evidence shows that 
an increased level of religiosity does not actually lead to rebellion against the state. On the 
contrary, research shows that an increased level of Islamic orthodoxy actually contributes to 
more political stability (McGlinchey, 2010; Montgomery & Heathershaw, 2016: 195; Junisbai 
et al, 2017). Still, by using terms as ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘Wahhabism’ in state narrative, the 
state is able to crack down on a multitude of organizations that have different ideologies and 
political goals (Tromble, 2017: 359; Omelicheva, 2017: 9).  
 
Representatives from state organizations like the State Commission of Religious Affairs and 
security agencies are often talking about extremism. According to Wolters, ‘security agencies 
in Kyrgyzstan certainly engage in the employment of the“discourse on danger”and regularly 
and publicly declare about the risks of extremists to the national security’ (2014: 16). This is, 
for example, argued by Zamirbek Turnsunbekov, a senior analyst at the State Commission of 
Religious Affairs. According to Turnsunbekov:  
‘(…) Radical Islam threatens to cause the Kyrgyz language and traditional styles of 
dress to vanish. Some radical Islamists use Arabic words while speaking in Kyrgyz. 
This [state of affairs] might lead to the loss of Kyrgyz national identity. This is why the 
state began to pay attention: the growing popularity of Islam goes against Kyrgyz 
culture ‘(Cited and edited by Artman, 2016a: 250). 
And according to the former director of the State Commission of Religious Affairs, Toygonbek 
Kalmatov: 
 ‘Our people themselves do not take in untraditional teachings with alien ideologies and 
objectives. But they [foreign religious groups] approach us, mainly the socially 
vulnerable sections of the population, by using financial funds from abroad. (…) This 
process, which creates destabilization and interference in internal affairs, gives rise to 
conflicts’ (As cited by Tromble, 2014: 533).  
Both remarks show how some government representatives are viewing foreign expressions 
like ‘Arabic words’ and ‘untraditional teachings with alien ideologies and objectives’ as 
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something that could be destructive for Kyrgyzstan. In this way, they are linking the threat of 
conflict and destabilization to forms of Islam that are not suitable with traditional Kyrgyz Islam.  
3.5 Religious Education  
In public remarks in national media, government representatives often emphasize the fact that 
the poor level of religious education in public schools or institutions of Islamic learning, 
madrassas, can contribute to an increase in radicalization. According to the director of the 
SCRA, Orozbek Moldaliyev, the ‘lack of good religious education in religious institutions is a 
fundamental problem that ... furthers the spread of radicalism and extremism’ (Nazarov, 2016). 
The former deputy director of the SCRA, Kanatbek Murzakhalikov, claims that ‘those who study 
Islam randomly lack a deep-rooted grasp of Sharia's canons or the hadiths and are therefore 
more susceptible to radicalisation -- even though they go to mosques and pray five times a 
day’ (Sultanov, 2017a). The best way to counter these radicalization processes, according to 
government representatives, is by investing in government-controlled religious education that 
could deepen the knowledge of Islam. In the Concept of the State Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic 
in the Religious Sphere, the state acknowledges the threat of foreign ideologies and underlines 
the need to create state regulation that could protect the main principles and the national 
interests of the Kyrgyz state. To control this, the concept advises that the state should provide 
religious education on public schools, analyze and license education on foreign religious 
schools and provide education to clergy and civil servants (Esenamanova, 2015). During a 
speech at a gathering of teachers and state officials, Atambayev underlined the importance of 
education in the fight against radicalism and against the spread of foreign forms of Islam. He 
said: 
 
‘It is necessary to stop hurting your head while praying. You should focus on education 
instead. In that case you will no longer confuse religion with Arab culture: The Almightily 
is neither an Arab nor a Kyrgyz, this is universal conscience and energy’ (As cited by 
Agenzia Fides, 2017).  
 
Following policy mentioned in the Concept for State Policy in the Religious Sphere, the State 
Commission of Religious Affairs and the Muftiate are currently tasked to create and provide 
religious education to educational institutes to prevent religious extremism. By implementing 
the subject ‘History of Religious Culture’ at multiple public schools in Kyrgyzstan, the SRCA is 
aiming to provide students with basic knowledge about religion. According to the deputy 
director of the SRCA, Zakir Chotayev, ‘this subject aims to present basic information to our 
young citizens so that they are prepared for the possible influence of religious movements and 
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destructive ideologies’ (As cited by Sultanov, 2017b). Similar to the SCRA, the Muftiate is 
responsible for creating and monitoring Islamic knowledge that is compatible with government 
discourses. By giving religious classes and publishing material about Islamic rituals, the 
Muftiate is expected to ‘foster the development of patriotic, nationalistic, political quietist and 
moderate Kyrgyz Muslims’ (Artman, 2016b: 6). In addition to this, the Muftiate is also 
responsible for testing the religious knowledge of imams who want to work at Kyrgyz mosques. 
Emil Jeenbekov, a representative of the interior ministry, stated the government is ‘trying to 
control the main mosques’ in Kyrgyzstan because there are concerns that some imams have 
extremist views. To control the content that the imams are spreading, the imams are therefore 
required to send reports to the Muftiate on a regular basis to show the content of their sermons.  
According to Deputy Mufti Ravshan azhy Eratov, the Muftiate expects imams and other 
religious representatives in Kyrgyzstan to discourage extremism in their sermons (Toktonaliev, 
2016). By providing correct knowledge about Islam and monitoring the spread of this 
knowledge, these institutions are able to identify Islamic discourses that differentiate from 
traditional Kyrgyz Islam, and are therefore useful tools to promote state discourse.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
After reviewing both state policy and state narrative, this chapter demonstrates that the notion 
of ‘traditional Kyrgyz Islam’ is used by the state to promote Kyrgyz national ideology in order 
to support nation-building efforts but also as way to legitimize state control over religious affairs 
and practices of Islam. First, this is visible in the fact that the state is propagandizing the 
historical connection between Kyrgyz identity and the Hanafi school of Islam. The state 
promotes ‘traditional Kyrgyz Islam’ as an important part of the Kyrgyz ethno-national identity 
and instrumentalizes a notion of Islamic identity that is similar to the notion of Islamic identity 
that was promoted during the Soviet period. By strengthening the connection between ethno-
national identity and Islam, the state can differentiate between a domestic form of Islam and 
foreign forms of Islam. Secondly, by emphasizing the moderate character of Kyrgyz Islam, the 
state can promote a kind of Islam that is compatible with state policies. According to state 
discourse, a moderate form of Islam should be tolerant towards Kyrgyz traditions and be 
apolitical and supportive towards state policies. With the help of the SCRA and the Muftiate, 
the government regulates religious education, the spread of Islamic knowledge and the 
activities of missionaries to control religious knowledge and protect Kyrgyz traditions. This 
shows that the state can act as an authority that ensures that Islam in Kyrgyzstan remains 
moderate and liberal. Thirdly, by using a ‘discourse of danger’ the state provides legitimization 
for its control of religious affairs and actions against religious organizations or forms of Islam 
that deviate from this government line or that promote religious traditions that are different then 
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Kyrgyz traditions. By using term as ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalism’, the state can portray both 
political and apolitical religious groups as potentially violent and condemn their activities as 
threats to Kyrgyz society. Given these points, the four main themes that are identified in state 
discourse all seem to be functioning as important arguments that can support state policy in 
the religious sphere. Based on this fact, the analysis of the results of the fieldwork will therefore 
also use the same four themes to assess if the arguments mentioned in state discourse are 
similar to the perceptions of respondents of Kyrgyz Islam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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4. Methodology  
 
4.1 Situation of Research 
Empirical research for this thesis was collected in the smallest republic in Central Asia: 
Kyrgyzstan. In July, 2017 Kyrgyzstan had a population of 5,789,122 inhabitants, where the 
Kyrgyz was the largest ethnic population (73,2%), followed by an Uzbek population (14,6%) 
and Russian population (5,8%). Other ethnic minorities constituted the remaining 6,4% of the 
population. (CIA Factbook, 2017). The research of this thesis was situated in the city of Bishkek, 
which is the capital of country. Bishkek is located in the north of Kyrgyzstan. The north of 
Kyrgyzstan is the most industrial part of the country with a large population of ethnic Russians. 
The south of Kyrgyzstan is traditionally seen as the more religious part of the country, due to 
the influence of the large Uzbek population (Heyat, 2004: 276). While the Russian population 
used to be the largest ethic population in Bishkek during the Soviet period, this changed after 
the independence from the Soviet Union. Currently, the Kyrgyz population is the largest ethnic 
population in Bishkek, with the Russian population as the second largest ethnic population 
(Schröder, 2017: 9).  
The city of Bishkek was located as the location for this research due to different reasons. The 
first reason was the possibility in Bishkek to find respondents from different parts of the country. 
Due to the high quality of universities and other student facilities, students from all over 
Kyrgyzstan come to Bishkek to study. Since the practice of Islam can differ from region to 
region, this city offers a good location to interview respondents with differing views about Islam. 
Second, as paragraph two will further explain, this research interviewed respondents from four 
different universities to broaden the range of diversity. Since Bishkek houses many universities 
with different religious and political orientations, the capital offered enough possibility to 
interview students that that are studying at universities that are significantly different from each 
other. Thirdly, as most of the field research on Islamization is carried out in south of country 
and in small cities and villages, this thesis is focused on an urban environment like Bishkek to 
analyze the developments there. Since both the urban environment as the north of Kyrgyzstan 
is considered as less religious then the countryside and the south of Kyrgyzstan, this research 
hopes to provide a different perspective then the research that is done in parts of the country 
that is considered as more religious.  
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4.2 Participant Selection 
The original aim of this research was to analyze the experiences of twenty-four university 
students, who are studying at one of three universities in Bishkek and who are ethnic Kyrgyz. 
This paragraph will explain the motivation for these specific criteria. The decision for this 
number of respondents was based on the fact that it was manageable number of people to 
interview in the time period of this field research and because a small number of respondents 
could offer a more in-depth view of the respondent’s view on the topic. Due to the fact that this 
research was focused on the personal experience and the personal view of the respondent, it 
was important to provide enough time and space for respondents to feel comfortable and to 
explain their viewpoint about a highly personal subject: their own Islamic identity. In this way, 
the sample size contributed to better communication and more in-depth knowledge.  
This research specifically focused on university students due to three important reasons. First, 
the age of students in Kyrgyzstan range from 18 till 25. This age group can be defined as the 
generation that grew up after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As literature demonstrated and 
results of this research will show, there seem to be a considerable gap between the Soviet 
generation and the post-Soviet generation in the perception of Islamic practices, which makes 
it an interesting factor to investigate. Secondly, it is interesting to focus at Kyrgyz youth since 
they are increasingly using internet sources to reconstruct their cultural identity. A study by 
American researcher Hans Ibold, ‘finds that Kyrgyz youth – catalysed by their ability to carry 
out searches and to maintain social connections online – are placing their cultural inheritance 
in a global context and questioning ‘tradition’ as few Kyrgyz have done before’ (2010: 521). 
This means that there is a high potential for university students to influenced by external 
discourses and thus also construct a different religious identity then government discourse 
promotes. Thirdly, as Junisbai et al (2017) argue, there is a hypothesis that university students 
are not as likely to perform religious rituals due to their secular background. Still, as studies 
have shown, university students in Kyrgyzstan are also becoming more religious (Junisbai et 
al, 2017). This is thus also an interesting hypothesis to include in the research.  
The original plan was to interview students from three different universities. The reason for this 
was to interview students from different social backgrounds. As DeYoung argues, there are 
huge differences between the level of education and the costs of tuitions fees of private 
universities, intergovernmental universities and state universities (DeYoung, 2010). The aim 
was therefore to interview students who are studying at a public, state university (Kyrgyz 
National University), at an inter-governmental university (Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University) 
and a private university (American University of Central Asia) (DeYoung, 2010: 13).  This 
research includes eight students from the American University of Central Asia (AUCA), eight 
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students from Kyrgyz National University (KNU) and seven students from the Kyrgyz-Turkish 
Manas University. Unfortunately, this research did not managed to interview eight students 
from Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University. Therefore, this research includes one respondent who 
studied at the Ala-too International University, which is a private university (DeYoung, 2010: 
13).  
Due to limited time and the sensitive topic of my research, a local research assistant 
contributed to this research in the process of selecting, approaching and interviewing students. 
By using the connections of this assistant and by using snowballing sampling, potential 
respondents were sought by asking interviewees if they could reach other potential subjects. 
In looking for respondents a few criteria were kept in mind: respondents had to be ethnic 
Kyrgyz, a student at a university in Bishkek and between the age of 18 and 25. They also had 
to identify themselves with their Muslim background. In this sense, the definition of Muslim is 
not understood as being a pious follower of the religion, but respondents had to distinguish 
that their Islamic identity was in any way an important part of who they are. The criteria for 
ethnic Kyrgyz was chosen, due to the fact that government discourse is often focused on the 
ethno-national identity which makes that an important component in the analysis. Although a 
balance in male and female respondents was sought in the selection, this factor did not prove 
to be an important criterion when looking at the research goals. Due to the limited time of the 
research, five male respondents were interviewed and nineteen female respondents. Still, the 
criteria mentioned above provide a clear focus yet also contribute to a diversity in viewpoint 
and perspectives.  
4.3 Data Collection  
The data-collection of this research is based on the results of semi-structured interviews. In 
total, the time period for this research constituted twenty days. Although this is a limited amount 
of time, it offered enough opportunity to interview twenty-four students and provide enough 
time to let them voice their opinion. Most of the interviews were done in English, and some 
interviews in Russian. The interviews in Russian were conducted with the help of an interpreter.  
All the interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the respondents and anonymized 
with the use of aliases. This anonymity was included to preserve confidentiality.  A list of the 
respondents, alphabetically listed by their aliases, can be found in the Appendix. This list 
mentions the alias, age, and origin of the respondents and the name of the university and the 
programme that the respondents attend.   
 The semi-structured type of interview was suited best for this research, since it allowed the 
possibility to steer the conversation and to ask follow-up questions during the interviews. It also 
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provided the opportunity for the respondent to bring up new topics that might be interesting for 
this research. In this way, the respondent was treated as a source with a unique background 
that could provide a valuable viewpoint and provide an in-depth picture of his or her attitude 
on religion. This was considered necessary, since personal experiences and other stories 
could shed a different light on the topic then academic sources and government discourse 
alone could do and thus provide more understanding of the topic. Another advantage of the 
semi-structured structure is that it offers flexibility to engage with the respondents’ willingness 
to share their stories. Sometimes, respondents are cautious to share personal experiences. In 
a semi-structured format, the interviewer can switch to more appropriate questions or ask 
questions about topics that have not been discussed yet. Taking all these things in 
consideration, qualitative interviews in a semi-structured format proves to be the best way to 
acquire in-depth information about the religious identity and personal views of students. 
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5.  Students Perceptions and State Discourse 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As chapter three demonstrated, there are four main topics that can be identified in state 
discourse. These four topics are related to relationship between the government and Islam. 
Whether it is the increasing popularity of religious clothing, untraditional teachings of foreign 
groups or other extremist elements: the state can compare other forms of Islam with the Kyrgyz 
form of Islam and condemn the unwanted Islamic discourses. In this way, the state portrays 
itself as an actor that can guard Kyrgyzstani citizens against extremist influences. The four 
topics that are analyzed in chapter three represent the government’s perspective towards the 
role of Islam in Kyrgyzstan and thus provides a good overview from the top-down perspective. 
However, although it is important to understand how the government is developing their 
religious policies, it is likewise important to see how the government approach towards Islam 
is perceived from a bottom-up perspective. This chapter will therefore look at how Kyrgyz 
citizens, in particular young Kyrgyz students, are experiencing the developments in the 
religious sphere and the approach of the government towards Islam. By using the structure of 
the four topics mentioned in state discourse, this chapter will look if students are using the 
same arguments as the government to explain religiosity in the public sphere and if the 
perspective of students on Islam align with the arguments that are mentioned in state discourse. 
This chapter ultimately demonstrates that the view of the students that were interviewed for 
this thesis is largely similar to state discourse on Islam and the religious sphere.  
5.2 Traditional Kyrgyz Islam 
The previous chapters demonstrated how government discourse is promoting the importance 
of a ‘traditional form of Islam’ in Kyrgyzstan. As official state policy and government narrative 
have shown, the state is using the historical connection to the Hanafi school to underline the 
tolerant and moderate nature of Islam and to show that Islam is closely tied to the ethnic and 
national identity of the Kyrgyz people. State discourse is often essentializing the connection 
between identity and religion by arguing that the Kyrgyz people are historically less religious 
due to their nomadic past. In this view, state discourse argues that Islam in Kyrgyzstan is 
composed of collective nomadic Kyrgyz traditions and thus more focused on morals and values 
then religiosity.  ‘Good’ public manifestations of Islam in Kyrgyzstan should therefore, 
according to the state, not contradict secular laws but rather be non-political and supportive of 
state policy and national building projects.  
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Similar to state discourse, the great majority of respondents (18) would underline the strong 
connection between Kyrgyz national identity and Islam. In their answers, students explain that 
Islam is an important fundament of society. Many students acknowledge that most of the 
Kyrgyz traditions are interwoven with Islamic rituals and that many morals and values are 
inspired by Islamic knowledge. In addition to this, students would also emphasize the moderate 
nature of Kyrgyz Islam and explain that Kyrgyz Islam differs from forms of Islam in other 
countries. Some would claim that Kyrgyz Muslims are not as religious as Muslims in other 
countries. In their opinion, Islam in Kyrgyzstan stands for freedom and tolerance while forms 
of Islam in other countries are stricter and more rule-based. Aisulu, for example, identifies the 
fact that Islam in Kyrgyzstan is more free then in other Islamic countries and Jyrgyal argues 
that Kyrgyz Islam is a ‘good Islam’ in comparison with Islam in the Middle East. Although these 
students would not include the term Hanafi in their answers, they did emphasize the unique 
moderate nature of Kyrgyz Islam. According to Benoka, Kyrgyz Muslims practice Islam in their 
own way: ‘they don’t go to the mosque on Friday, they believe in God but they don’t pray’. 
Bermet argues that Muslims in Kyrgyzstan have different ‘Islamic standards’. She says: 
‘Kyrgyz Islam is connected to my identity. I don’t pray, but I try to live according to 
Kyrgyz Islamic standards. I have a lot of friends from Turkey, who pray every day but I 
don’t do that’. 
While most of the students were quite positive about the tolerant and moderate nature of 
Kyrgyz Islam, a few students voiced their discontent about the hypocritical attitude of Muslims 
in Kyrgyzstan. In this way, they disagree with the ‘traditional Islam’ that the government 
promotes in their discourse. It is interesting to see that both students who define themselves 
as religious Muslims as students who define themselves as not religious at all voice the same 
criticism about Kyrgyz Islam. According to Sultan, who identifies himself more as an atheist 
with Islamic values, Islam in Kyrgyzstan is not ‘real Islam’. According to him, the fact that his 
parents are drinking and practicing shamanistic traditions while also calling themselves 
Muslims shows that this ‘typical Kyrgyz Islam’ is a fake version of Islam. Fatima, a student who 
prays five times a day and wears a hijab, is also critical of the way that people in Kyrgyzstan 
decide to mix certain traditions in the way they practice Islam. According to her, ‘if you choose 
on religion, you should follow this religion. Of course we should think about our traditions, but 
that does not say that our ancestors were right. We should choose our own way’. These 
statements of Sultan and Fatima are examples of how students are currently analyzing 
traditions that are practiced by the older generation. Results from the interviews show that 
many students are starting to question these traditions. This development will be further 
explained in chapter six.   
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5.2 Religious Clothing 
All of the students recognize the fact that more and more people are starting to wear religious 
clothing in Kyrgyzstan and are eager to share their opinion about this development. Due to the 
fact that religious clothing is a much-debated topic in Kyrgyzstan, students encounter different 
narratives about the correctness of religious clothing on a daily basis. It is therefore not 
surprising to see that the arguments that are mentioned in state narrative can also be identified 
in remarks that students give about religious clothing. As chapter three demonstrated, this 
state narrative warns against the popularity of foreign Islamic clothing, the disappearance of 
the Kyrgyz national dress and the potential risk that religious clothing could mean for the 
identity and safety of Kyrgyz people. But although these themes are visible in the remarks that 
students give, it is however surprising to see that an overwhelming majority of the students 
share this government narrative. Seventeen of twenty-four students are convinced that the 
hijab is not, and should not become, a part of Kyrgyz culture. Although not everyone necessary 
thinks that the hijab should be banned, several comments show that students worry about the 
rising popularity of the hijab. Gulnara, for example, says: ‘I don’t think you should wear hijab. 
There are other and different ways to God’. Many respondents would underline this same 
sentiment. According to them, Islam does not force people to wear the hijab. They argue that 
Kyrgyzstan have their own traditional clothes that people can wear to cover their hair and be 
modest. Aisulu says:  
‘The hijab contradicts with Kyrgyz Islam. You can still wear modest dress. We have our 
own dresses that we can wear, for example the Kyrgyz headscarf. So I think you must 
wear Islamic clothes in the way that you don’t lose your Kyrgyz identity’. 
Similar to government narrative, students argue that the major reason that people are starting 
to wear the hijab is because they are influenced by sources from foreign countries. Especially 
sources from Turkish and Arabic countries are named as important factors that inspire people 
to change their attire. Jamiliya says, for example: ‘during my childhood, there were not a lot of 
people in Islamic clothes, but now I see it more. It is because of the Turkish and Arabic people. 
It is more foreign Islam. Islam is not new, but we can see a different form of Islam’. This fear 
for an influx of foreign culture in Kyrgyzstan, encompasses the fear for the potential danger 
that these clothes could represent. While students express the fear that the rising popularity of 
religious clothing could lead to the disappearance of traditional Kyrgyz identity, some students 
also admit that they are actually afraid for the people themselves. According to Aziza, people 
in a niqaab or closed veil pose a real threat for her and her surroundings. She says: 
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‘When I see people in hijab that is closing their eyes, I’m trying to avoid them. I see a 
lot of them in the bazaar. Inside I am afraid of them. I don’t want to talk them. I always 
feel quite uncomfortable when I see them. Probably they have bombs in their 
backpack’. 
5.2.1 Government Policy on Religious Clothing 
Although Aziza’s fear for a terrorist attack might not have been based on an imminent threat, 
it reflects the same sentiment that is also visible in the public remarks of Atambayev where he 
suggests that veiled women could potentially radicalize and turn in to terrorists. This same 
promotion of fear for foreign dress can also be identified in the case of the billboards that 
Atambayev’s administration erected in 2016. The example of the billboards was mentioned by 
six of the students. Four students were quite positive about the effect of the billboards. 
According to them, the message of these billboards could protect people against the influence 
of foreign countries and provide information on how people should practice Kyrgyz Islam. 
Karina supported the billboards because they ‘protect the Islam of Kyrgyzstan and are standing 
up against the Islam of Arab countries’.  However, two other students were more critical of the 
way that the government used the posters to promote their own form of Islam. According to 
Nazgul, ‘Atambayev made these posters about hijabs. I think government should not interfere 
with religion’. Mariam is also quite critical, since she knows that ‘people are really easily 
influenced by these government initiatives’.  
Among the respondents who are convinced that the hijab does not fit in Kyrgyz culture, there 
are different ideas about what state policy towards religious clothing should be. Some students 
think that the government should regulate more and exercise more control in the religious 
sphere. Baktigul is convinced that the government should have the right to ban the hijab and 
Aisulu thinks that the government should ‘defend the national dress and clothes’. Others, like 
Kauhar, know that there are some legal restrictions to do this. She is therefore convinced that 
the government should look for other ways.  
‘Government can’t ban hijabs, but we need some laws that could regulate and protect 
people from the bad influence from certain Islamic groups’.  
Although some students are pleading for stricter legislation, most of the students are relatively 
tolerant towards people who are wearing the hijab. Many of them would emphasize that the 
hijab is not a part of Kyrgyz tradition, but that they still think that people should do whatever 
they want. Almost half of the respondents would tell stories about friends or relatives that 
decided to wear the hijab. For many of them, religious clothing is something that they would 
see on the street and on the social media pages of their friends and relatives and it thus 
becomes more ‘normal’ to them.  
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5.2.2 Hijab as Part of Kyrgyz Culture 
Three respondents think radically different about the government policy on religious clothing 
then the rest of the respondents. Two of these respondents are wearing the hijab themselves 
and one is thinking about starting to wear the hijab. Both Anara and Fatima decided to start 
wearing the hijab when they were in their teenage years. Anara’s choice inspired Anara’s 
mother to also start wearing the hijab. Keres is still thinking about wearing the hijab, but she 
thinks that she is not religious enough to do it now and she is also afraid of what her parents 
would think of this. Both Anara and Fatima often experience that people are treating them 
differently because of their hijab. Anara decided to go to another high school because her 
teachers were only commenting on her hijab.  When Fatima started wearing the hijab, she got 
a lot of comments from friends and strangers. Even now, people would often ask why she 
would wear long skirts and the hijab. She says: ‘I sometimes feel discriminated when I sit on 
the bus, and see people staring at me. Sometimes, old women are asking me why I am wearing 
the hijab’. All three of the girls are convinced that the hijab can be an important part of Islam in 
Kyrgyzstan. Keres says that she thinks that the hijab can be a ‘continuation of Kyrgyz Islam’. 
They are all convinced that the government should regulate religion in order to prevent 
extremism, but they also underline that the government should not control what clothes people 
are wearing. According to Anara,  
‘(…) the government should not interfere in what people are wearing. These are 
personal things. The government is promoting Kyrgyz national tradition dress, but they 
are so uncomfortable. The hijab is more comfortable, and it is also according to Islamic 
law, so that’s why it is important that we keep wearing this’.  
5.3 Religious Extremism 
Although students are constructing their own Islamic identity in multiple different ways, what is 
interesting to see is that actually all the twenty-four students mention that Kyrgyz traditions are 
important elements of Kyrgyz culture and that they these traditions must be preserved. This is 
both the case for students who don’t identify themselves as a believer as students who 
consider themselves as religious Muslims. As this thesis will show in chapter six, there are 
some disagreements among students about the question which Kyrgyz traditions are 
considered as elements of ‘good’ Islam and which traditions should be abandoned. 
Nevertheless, all of the students are convinced that Kyrgyz traditions are an important source 
of their morals and values and therefore need to keep on existing. According to Emil,  
‘We must protect our Kyrgyz culture. We are a secular country and we must therefore 
protect all our traditions’. 
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As mentioned before, a popular narrative that can be identified in state discourse is that foreign 
ideologies and practices could threaten Kyrgyz tradition and national identity. Previous 
examples have showed how politicians and other government representatives warned for the 
rising popularity of the Arabic language and practices that are foreign to Kyrgyz culture. Similar 
arguments are also visible in the examples that student provide, when they talk about how they 
see Islam in Kyrgyzstan changing and how Kyrgyz people should protect their own ‘form of 
Islam’. Aibek, for example, explains:  
‘I can even see that in Kyrgyzstan, during prayer, people use different positions. We 
have our own positions in Islam, but I see now that different influences from foreigners 
influence our Islam. I think that we should stick to our form of Islam’. 
Jamiliya identifies these foreign influences in the change of language in her immediate 
surroundings. To her regret, more and more people are using Arabic terms for religious 
holidays and use Arabic phrases instead of Kyrgyz sayings. According to Chingiz, a more purist 
form of Islam could eventually slow down the development of Kyrgyzstan. He therefore hopes 
that people who practice this kind of Islam ‘will be modern and Islamic’. According to him, ‘it is 
more about values and combining it with Kyrgyz tradition’. These examples clearly show how 
some students misunderstands religiousness as signs of radicalism and therefore perceive it 
as a negative development. When religious people are changing their habits, friends and family 
feel that they should protect them against forces that could influence them. This approach is 
similar to state discourse that condemns Islamization as a sign of a growing process of 
radicalization.  
5.3.1 Government Role in Safeguarding Kyrgyz Traditions 
By instrumentalising the threat of extremism, the state promotes itself as the sole actor that 
could safeguard the secular state and Kyrgyz traditions against these extremist influences. A 
convincing majority, eighteen of twenty-four respondents, reflect this same narrative in their 
answers and agree that it is the responsibility of the government to regulate Islam and to 
promote traditions in order to prevent radicalization. There are, however, different reasons for 
students to support government regulation of Islam. Some students view the increasing 
religiousness as negative development that could threaten Kyrgyz culture. Kauhar and Emil, 
who both claim that Islam does not play an important role in their lives, think that the 
government must preserve Kyrgyz traditions and regulate Islam to stop the Islamization of 
Kyrgyzstan. Kauhar thinks that it is the task of the government to ‘control the influence of Islam 
on people and create a kind of censorship’. According to Emil: 
‘The government needs to promote traditions. The country is not developing, Islam is 
growing and Islam will become more important. Kyrgyz traditions will disappear if 
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Kyrgyzstan would become more Islamic. Speaking as a lawyer, we should regulate 
everything. The government should be controlling more’. 
Other students, who stand more positive towards foreign influences of Islam, are supporting 
government regulation of religion out of different reasons. These students are not opposed to 
the process of Islamization but try to differentiate between Islamization and radicalization. They 
underline the need for the government to provide qualified sources of Islam to educate people 
about the difference between these two processes. Fatima, for example, tries to devote her 
life to Islam and reads from different foreign sources but also supports government censorship 
of sources in order to battle extremism. Aibek often goes to lectures in the mosque and listens 
to foreign preachers, but understands government control of the mosques and imams to limit 
the influence of ‘bad forces’. He says: 
‘The people are not becoming influenced by the bad forces. It is good that they control 
it. It is in accordance with the law. But it should not be against the rules of Islam. The 
government should not go against this’. 
What is interesting is that, although most students are satisfied with government control or did 
not specifically comment on the performance of the government to fight radicalization, four 
students are convinced that the government is unable to provide security and that the 
government actually should be controlling more. These students plead for more government 
control of Islamic institutions and increased level of regulation to identify potential actors of 
radicalization. More interesting perhaps is that two of these students are girls who identify 
themselves as practicing Muslims who are highly influenced by foreign Islamic sources. 
Although one would presume that they prefer less government control, they actually argue that 
government should invest more in regulating Islam. Keres, for example, argues: 
‘I can see that there is no authority that can help and that can monitor the radicalization. 
The government is too weak, I think. They should control more mosques and 
madrassas’. 
Anara is also critical of the role of the government when it comes to control of Islam. Although 
she first argues that the government should ‘not interfere in what people are wearing’, she also 
thinks that the government is responsible for the information that is flooding in the country and 
should therefore regulate more. She says: 
‘The government has a low influence on religion on Kyrgyzstan currently. (…) The 
government is doing a poor job on this. They do not care about Islam. The government 
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must regulate Islam, in the way that they provide a basic knowledge about Islam. The 
government must regulate the information that is coming in’. 
5.4 Religious Education 
As is visible in both state policy as government narrative, the state defines religious education 
as an important tool against radicalization. According to the state, the poor quality of religious 
education and the lack of proper religious knowledge are factors that could eventually lead to 
radicalism. State discourse therefore underlines the need of creating state-organized religious 
education that can provide people basic knowledge about Islam and about Kyrgyz traditions. 
Similar to other three themes mentioned in this chapter, student perceptions of religious 
education more or less align with state discourse about religious education. According to a 
majority of students, religious education can be an important tool to teach people about Kyrgyz 
Islam and to discourage radicalism. In their answers, students mention that the lack of 
knowledge about Islamic practices and the lack of qualified religious education are important 
causes for radicalization. Furthermore, half of the students (12) suggested that the government 
must implement religious education as a tool to protect Kyrgyz traditions and Kyrgyz Islam. 
This shows that students attach great importance to the role of the government in providing 
knowledge about Islam.    
An argument that was often mentioned by students is that people radicalize because they lack 
basic knowledge about Islam. Some would argue that religious education in madrassas could 
promote the wrong kind of Islam and that religious institutions therefore should be controlled 
by the government. Others would blame the lack of sources that could teach people about 
Islam. Some students argue that uneducated people from the southern, rural parts of 
Kyrgyzstan are the most susceptible to radicalization. Nazgul, for example, thinks that the 
‘uneducated and poor part of our society are getting radicalized more sooner’.  Providing 
basic knowledge about Islamic rules and Islamic practices to young and uneducated people is, 
according to them, therefore currently the best way to fight radicalization.  
Similar to the way that state discourse promotes itself as a neutral actor that can provide basic 
knowledge about religion, students also argue that the state is responsible for providing 
education that could teach about the basic values of Islam. In total, half of the students mention 
that that the government should provide religious education to students. They are convinced 
that government-controlled religious education can be an important tool to discourage 
extremism. According to Fatima, the lack of ‘qualified sources of Islam’ can eventually lead to 
radicalization. She argues that teaching religion to young people in schools is a good way to 
prevent this. She says: 
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‘Most people in Kyrgyzstan are Muslim, that’s why we need qualified education. Maybe 
courses and lectures. (…) I think that government should promote religion in schools, 
and provide basic knowledge about Islam’.  
Students think that the government is able to provide a more tolerant, liberal version of Islam 
then foreign actors and therefore support state attempts to create a religious curriculum. Aziza 
argues that the ‘government should provide information on what is good Islam and what is bad 
Islam’. Even students who are cautious of government control of religion, favour religious 
education provided by the government since it can stimulate basic knowledge about religion. 
Kauhar, for example, thinks that the government should not necessarily restrict religion, but 
reduce the influence of radical Islam by ‘providing more real knowledge about Islam’. Ultimately, 
remarks by students thus show that they see the lack of religious knowledge as an important 
cause for radicalization. Out of their conviction that basic knowledge about Islam could stop 
this development, they are therefore supporting government-organized religious education. In 
line with the way how state discourse promote itself, the students therefore also support the 
role of the government as an actor that could decide which religious education is acceptable 
in order to prevent people from radicalizing.  
5.5 Conclusion 
First, this chapter demonstrated that the majority of the students acknowledge that Islam is an 
important part of Kyrgyz society. According to students, Islam constitutes an important part of 
their upbringing and culture. In their interpretation of Islam, students define aspects of local 
Islam that, according to them, are typical Kyrgyz. They argue, for example, that Kyrgyz Muslims 
are less religious then Muslims in other countries and that Kyrgyz Islam is a tolerant and 
moderate form of Islam. Although there are students who do not fully identify with this kind of 
Islam, most of the students agree that these elements of Kyrgyz Islam are important parts of 
their national identity. In this way, a majority of the students are voicing the same arguments 
as the state does and supporting a form of Islam that is similar to the form of Kyrgyz Islam that 
the state is promoting in state discourse. According to state discourse, this Kyrgyz Islam must 
be protected against foreign influences. Whether it is the increasing popularity of religious 
clothing, untraditional teachings or extremist elements: the state can compare other forms of 
Islam with the Kyrgyz form of Islam and condemn the unwanted Islamic discourses. In this way, 
the state portrays itself as important actor that can guard Kyrgyzstani citizens against extremist 
influences. 
What is interesting is that the state ‘discourse of danger’ proves to be effective in convincing 
students about the need to have more government control of Islam. Concluding from the 
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remarks that students gave, a few interesting points can be identified. First, it is interesting to 
see that Arana and Keres, two girls who identify themselves as religious Muslims and who are 
convinced that the hijab can be a part of Kyrgyz culture, are actually also the only students 
who are pleading for more government control of religion. Although two students are not 
representative for the whole group, this seems an interesting factor that can be further explored. 
By comparing it with information in the literature review, this example contradicts the 
government’s narrative that public piety automatically leads to more radicalization and to 
political forms of Islam. In line what McGlinchey (2009) and Junisbai et al (2017) have argued, 
this example shows that an increased level of religiosity does not challenge the government 
but actually increases support for the political system. Second, the overwhelming fear for the 
influences of foreign forms of Islam and the fear for losing their Kyrgyz identity is a clear sign 
that students in this research are receptive for a ‘discourse of danger’. Many students are using 
the same arguments as the government to note the increased popularity of Islamic dress and 
religious ideas. It is interesting to see that many students often mention the importance of the 
‘secular state’ and ‘secular laws’, which shows that they attach great importance to the role of 
the government to act as a neutral actor in the religious sphere. They perceive foreign forms 
of Islam as unwanted influences and are therefore also convinced that the government should 
exercise control over the religious sphere. This is important to consider, since this 
demonstrates that most of the students are convinced that government should regulate 
religious groups and provide religious knowledge to prevent radicalization. Given these points, 
this chapter demonstrates that the perception of students aligns with the major arguments that 
can be identified in state discourse and that the majority of students are thus supportive of 
government policy on religion. 
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6. Student Perceptions and External Discourses 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the vast majority of respondents agree with the four 
main elements in government discourse that promote a Kyrgyz form of Islam and the 
authoritative role of the government in protecting this form of Islam. In line with government 
discourse, students believe that the Kyrgyz national identity is closely connected with Islamic 
traditions and symbols. However, as several scholars argue, there are also different external 
sources that are contradicting government discourse and are influencing the young generation 
in their reconstruction of their Islamic identity (Borbieva, 2009; Montgomery, 2016; McBrien, 
2017). It is important to underline that external discourse in this thesis is understood as sources 
that are different then sources that are distributed or promoted by the government. Instead of 
showing only the similarities between government discourse and student discourse, it is 
necessary to analyze elements in student remarks that deviate from government discourse. 
By looking at results from the interviews, this thesis identified three important topics that are 
different from official government line in sate discourse. Namely, contrary to what government 
discourse promotes, students are learning about Islam from foreign and ‘extremist’ sources 
and are reevaluating their view on the linkage between ethno-national identity and Islamic 
identity and the role of pre-Islamic rituals in Kyrgyz society. To show the difference between 
state discourse and the elements in student discourse, this chapter will first explain the role of 
the internet and social media in the process of gaining new information about Islam, and will 
then further explain how external sources on internet increasingly influence student’s 
perspective on Islamic identity and Kyrgyz traditions.  
6.2 New Interest in Islam  
Almost all of the twenty-four respondents recognize the fact that people in Kyrgyzstan are 
becoming more religious and that the role of Islam is becoming more important in society. Both 
students that grew up in Bishkek, as well as students who grew up in other parts of Kyrgyzstan, 
argue that an increasing number of their friends and relatives are going to the mosque and are 
praying every day. According to several students, this renewed interest in Islam is particularly 
visible among the younger generation. In his own immediate surrounding in Bishkek, Chingiz 
notices that more of his friends became interested in Islam and started to follow Islamic 
principles. He argues that young people have access to more resources then the previous 
generation. Since most young people in Kyrgyzstan are actively using social media, this 
development is also visible in messages on Facebook, Instagram and other social media 
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platforms. According to respondents, many young people are currently portraying themselves 
as faithful Muslims on social media. In posts on Facebook and Instagram, people show that 
they are participating with Islamic holidays or attending Friday prayer. In the last couple of 
years, Baktigul started to receive more Whatsapp messages from people who wished her a 
‘Happy Friday’ and Islamic greetings during Islamic holidays. She also noticed that more of her 
friends posted pictures when they are going to the mosque or when they are fasting during 
Ramadan. According to her, this is not only the case in her group of friends but part of bigger 
trend among Kyrgyz youth. Kauhar, Aisulu and Saikal argue that it is currently ‘trendy’ to post 
pictures of yourself with a hijab and to share quotes from the Quran or the Hadith.  
By reading messages from friends related to Islam on social media, some students claim that 
social media platforms influence their view on Islam. Alima, for example, says that she actually 
never searched for information about Islam on internet, but that messages on the Russian 
social media website Odnoklassniki have sparked her interests to learn more about Islam. 
Jyrgyal learned about Islam through ‘Instagram-stories’ of her friends and Anara argues that 
messages on Facebook and Instagram have had an ‘enormous influence on how people think 
about Islam’. Similar to Anara, students mention that there is a growing curiosity among their 
friends and family to search for basic knowledge of Islam. Many of them mention the fact that 
young people are not fully satisfied with their own Islamic identity and they are therefore eager 
to search for new sources on the internet. Kauhar explains that: ‘Young people are now 
searching for Islam on the internet. They want to search for real Islam. To search for questions 
like: do I get to heaven?’ By searching for authoritative sources on Islamic topics on internet, 
students express the desire to look further then the Islamic knowledge that their parents 
provided them. Several students say that they learned about Kyrgyz Islamic traditions from 
their parents, but that they only gained real knowledge about Islam by learning it from external 
discourses. This is, for example, visible in the case of Aisulu. She learned all the basics of 
Islam from her parents, but she explains that she learned ‘the most important things’ of Islam 
from internet sources and friends. These new insights have led to tensions between her and 
her parents. She says: ‘My mother was very shocked that I knew these things about Islam, and 
became very worried. She would ask me why I would become more religious’. According to 
her, her parents have no real knowledge about Islam and are therefore not able to properly 
explain things about Islam to her. 
6.3 External Discourses 
In their attempt to search for knowledge, a large number of the students would mention that 
they learn the most from sermons by Islamic preachers on internet. In total, twelve out of 
twenty-four students mention that they regularly watch videos from local and foreign Islamic 
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preachers on Youtube or other media platforms. According to students, these videos are 
becoming gradually more popular. Many of them mention that friends and family members are 
also watching these videos. A few students would name the Russian imam Shamil Alyautdinov 
as a big influence. This Moscow-based imam is popular among Muslims in the Russian-
speaking world and known for its liberal and modern approach of Islam (Ragozin, 2005). The 
name of Nouman Ali Khan, a young Islamic scholar from the United States who has published 
several books on the Quran, was also mentioned a couple of times. Anara, Chingiz and Keres 
explain that they are big fans of Shamil Alyautdinov because he is a modern person who covers 
modern topics. Keres, for example, emphasizes that she likes Alyautdinov because he is ‘really 
Muslim but also really open’ and because he is promoting woman’s rights and sport. Other 
than the ability of preachers to explain things in a modern way, one student also appreciated 
the fact that foreign speakers discuss topics that are more advanced than the topics that 
Islamic clergy in Kyrgyzstan cover. According to Anara,  
‘There is a big difference between what the things that these foreign preachers are 
saying and what I see that preachers in Kyrgyzstan are talking about. For me, the 
issues that people in Kyrgyzstan are discussing are very simple. They present Islamic 
ideas in a very simplistic way. I really prefer to listen to Nouman Ali Khan’. 
It is understandable that Anara, who studies at the Theology faculty of the Kyrgyz-Turkish 
Manas University, is looking for knowledge that is more challenging. The other students, 
however, actually express their fondness of sermons of Kyrgyz preachers due to their ability 
to explain things in an understandable way. The sermons of ex-Mufti Chubak azhy Zhalilov are 
for example quite popular among students. The majority of the students would listen to the 
videos that his organization, Nasaat Media, posts on YouTube and Facebook, but some also 
listen to his sermons on the ‘Nasaat Media’ smartphone app. According to local religious 
experts and scholars, Chubak azhy Zhalilov is currently the most influential religious authority 
in Kyrgyzstan. He is very popular on Facebook and his YouTube account has more than 
100.000 subscribers (Toktonaliev, 2017). Many students express their admiration of his ability 
to give answers to difficult Islamic topics. According to Timurbek, Zhalilov provides answers in 
language that everybody can understand. This, according to Jyrgal, is different from the official 
Islamic clergy in Kyrgyzstan: 
‘I don’t listen to other Islamic preachers. I do not understand them. They are talking in 
Arabic, you don’t get the sense. But with the ex-mufti, he really understands things very 
well’. 
As the example in chapter three showed, Chubak azhy Zhalilov is often mentioned in news 
media due to these controversial remarks on Islamic topics. In November 2017, Zhalilov 
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announced that he married a second wife, which is technically not allowed by Kyrgyzstan’s 
secular laws. This lead to a public debate about the legalization of polygamy (Ryder and 
Siddikov, 2017; Djanibekova, 2017). Zhalilov also condemned the public celebration of Nooruz, 
the Persian New Year, and said that people should not celebrate since ‘it is a holiday for non-
believers’ (24.kg, 2018). Some students voice their disapproval of Zhalilov’s choice to marry a 
second wife and have therefore decided to stop listening to his sermons. Chingiz, for example, 
listened to Zhalilov but now he thinks that Zhalilov is ‘corrupted’ and a ‘radical’.  Fatima thinks 
that Zhalilov is too manipulating and that he should stop dictating things to people in his 
sermons. Other students, like Jyrgyal and Timurbek, also do not agree with some of Zhalilov’s 
remarks but are still listening to his sermons. For them, the fact that Zhalilov can explain things 
in a way that they can understand is a great benefit.  
As mentioned before, half of the students currently look for external sources on internet to 
provide them with new knowledge about Islam and give them a better understanding of the 
rules of the Islam. From these twelve students, only Aibek, Anara and Fatima would voice that 
they learn from local Islamic clergy in their attempt to construct their identity. The rest of the 
twelve students would argue that foreign Islamic preachers and preachers like Chubak azhy 
Zhalilov are currently the most important sources for them to gain knowledge about Islam. This 
is important to point out, because these sources show that students are constructing their 
Islamic identity in a way that is different than government discourse promotes. Not only do 
students search for other sources then the government-controlled clergy of the Muftiate, they 
also get inspired by ‘foreign ideologies’ from foreign preachers and are learning from a Kyrgyz 
preacher that is considered an ‘extremist’ by government representatives. In this way, these 
external sources can provide them with ideas that contradict the form of Islam that the 
government promotes and are thus sources that are not fully compatible with government 
discourse. This point is therefore the first important discrepancy between government 
discourse and the view of students towards Islam.  
6.4 Reconstructing Islamic Identity  
The second discrepancy between government discourse and student discourse is visible in 
the process where external discourses are weakening the connection between the ethno-
national identity and Muslimness. As was mentioned chapter two and three, government 
discourse ties Muslimness to Kyrgyz national identity and promotes it as an integral part of 
every Kyrgyz citizen. Students are, however, starting to redefine their Islamic identity in a 
different way than government discourse does. Instead of tying their Islamic identity to their 
Kyrgyz identity, a majority of students is convinced that that they have to make a choice if they 
want say that they are Muslim. In this way, their Islamic identity becomes a signifier for a 
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personal religious identity rather than for an ethno-national identity. This process is visible in 
the remark of Nazgul, who explains that she still feels guilty to call herself a Muslim, even 
though she is Kyrgyz, was raised by religious parents and practice Islamic traditions.  Before 
Nazgul start questioning her Islamic identity, she was an atheist. Now, after she researched 
Islam more on the internet, she is still not sure if she can call herself a Muslim. She says:  
‘I cannot say that I am a Muslim, without first studying it in details. (...) I feel guilty when 
I say that I am full Muslim.  Maybe there are things that I haven’t fully explored’.  
This shift in the interpretation of Islamic identity was discussed in the literature review, where 
Borbieva (2009) argues that external discourses influence the local interpretations of Islam and 
provide new ideas about the issue of identity. As Borbieva writes, these discourses challenge 
‘the notion of Muslim-by-birth, asserting that ‘Muslimness’ is not primordial, inborn quality but 
a state of being that is constructed (and reconstructed) through action’ (Borbieva, 2009: 20-
21). Although it is not sure which discourses have influence on students, it is interesting to see 
that a convincing majority of students (14) are actually questioning the notion of ‘Muslim-by-
birth’. These students argue in their own way that it is not possible to call yourself a full Muslim 
if you are not practicing Islamic rituals or if you do not believe in God. Some students are quite 
disappointed in Kyrgyz Islam and think that Muslims should live according to Islamic law to 
claim their Islamic identity. Sultan, for example, thinks that Islam in Kyrgyzstan is not how it 
supposed to be. He no longer believes in the strong connection between his ethno-national 
identity and Islam and believes that you have to follow the rules to call yourself Muslim. He 
says: 
‘People believe that if you are born in Kyrgyz family, you would also automatically 
become a Muslim. I don’t believe this anymore. (…) If you are a Muslim, you have to 
do everything. You have to follow the rules’. 
What is interesting though, is that a majority of students emphasize in the beginning of the 
interview that they are not practicing Muslims who fully commit to the Islamic lifestyle. Students 
value Islam as an important part of their upbringing and of their culture, but in their answers 
they also underline that they cannot consider themselves fully Muslim since they are not 
religious enough. This shows that they follow a standard that dictates when someone can 
identify themselves as be a Muslim.  Although some, like Emil, Aziza, Bermet and Mariam 
argue that they are automatically Muslims because they are Kyrgyz, many of the students 
differentiate between the concept of ‘ethnic Muslims’ and ‘true’ or ‘real’ Muslims. Fatima, for 
example, explained that she was brought up in a family where everyone was not religious and 
thus ‘ethnic Muslim’ but where eventually everyone started practicing Islam and thus became 
‘practicing Muslims’. Mariam believes that she is Muslim because her family is Muslim but she 
 
43 
also thinks that if you are a ‘true Muslim’ you have to do pray every day and read the Quran. 
Aibek, who tries to devote himself to an Islamic lifestyle, believes that he should practice more 
Islamic rituals to call himself a ‘real’ Muslim. According to him: 
‘Five years ago I could pray in my hometown, I was practicing every day, I was following 
all the traditions. Now, I am not a real Muslim, because of my lifestyle in Bishkek. (…) 
If you believe Islam you start practicing it. If you don’t practice it, you don’t believe in 
Islam’. 
By differentiating between definitions of Muslimness, students try to show that that there is a 
difference between a notion of Islamic identity that is connected to their ethno-national identity 
and a notion of Islamic identity that is more focused on believing and practice. In their own way 
of constructing their Islamic identity, students no longer draw solely on the discourses of the 
previous generation but are influenced by new ideas about Islam and about new prerequisites 
that are needed to call yourself a Muslim. In this way, the concept of believing and belonging 
that was constructed by McBrien (2017) is very much visible in the discourse that students 
voice. As mentioned before, McBrien identifies that new definitions of Islam define Islam as 
something that is based on believing instead of an ethno-national belonging. In her book, 
McBrien argues that the notion of believing is contradicting the notion of ethno-national 
belonging, which is an important part of the form of the Islam that Kyrgyz government is 
promoting. This is interesting to point out, since this means that a majority of respondents are 
starting to view Islam as a ‘faith-oriented identity’. This does not necessarily mean that students 
are fully rejecting the notion of ethno-national belonging that the government promotes, but it 
does show that students are adapting new ideas about Islam that are contradicting state 
discourse  
6.5 Tolerance towards Pre-Islamic Traditions 
Chapter five showed that all twenty-four respondents are supportive of government attempts 
to protect Kyrgyz traditions against foreign influences. They are convinced that Kyrgyz 
traditions are part of their national identity and are therefore in favor of more government 
control. However, results from the interviews show that in their support of Kyrgyz traditions, 
some students are starting to differentiate between traditions that are compatible with Islam 
and traditions that contradict Islam. In reflecting on their traditions, these students are starting 
to reevaluate their opinion about Kyrgyz traditions and argue that the traditions that are based 
on pre-Islamic beliefs should not be practiced anymore by Kyrgyz people. This intolerance 
towards pre-Islamic traditions can thus been seen as the third important theme in student 
discourse that is different than what government discourse is promoting. Namely, a high 
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tolerance towards pre-Islamic traditions in Kyrgyz society. Several presidents have made it 
clear in public remarks that Islam in Kyrgyzstan is composed of different religious traditions 
and that Kyrgyz Muslims therefore should not criticize local customs. Former president 
Atambayev stressed the fact that Islam was adapted by the Kyrgyz people because it did not 
contradict ‘local customs and traditions’ and ‘the worldview of the nomads’. In this way, the 
government differentiate between versions of ‘good Islam’ that tolerate pre-Islamic, nomadic 
customs and versions of ‘bad Islam’ that is propagating against these customs. 
Almost all of the twenty-four students mention the important role that pre-Islamic traditions play 
in the religious life of their family members and friends. Although there are a lot of pre-Islamic 
rituals in Kyrgyz Islam, there were four important rituals that were mentioned by almost all of 
the students. This included; burning a juniper branch to cleanse oneself from bad luck (archa), 
tying a ribbon at a tree at holy sites (mazars) to receive luck or to pray to God, baking seven 
breads (borsok) to remember the deceased and to scare away evil spirits and the celebration 
of the Persian New Year (nooruz). Apart from that, some students also mention that their family 
members would visit fortune tellers and shamanistic healers. Due to the fact that these pre-
Islamic rituals are important elements of Kyrgyz Islam, some students also mention that they 
often participate with these rituals themselves. Students would, for example, explain that their 
mothers bake seven breads or burn the juniper tree for them after an important event or that 
they visit a mazar with their family member to tie a ribbon at a tree. Aisulu, for example, says: 
‘We go there [mazar, MK] and ask something good from God. When we, for example, 
make a wish from the tree, there is nothing bad in this, it actually helps us. It is God’s 
miracle. We have to do this, for comfort and for the benefit of us. (…) Our family is also 
going to these healers. This is typically Kyrgyz Islam, everything is so mixed’. 
Similar to Aisulu, many students acknowledge that these rituals are an important part of their 
Kyrgyz tradition. Although many of them voice that they actually don’t believe that these rituals 
work, thirteen of twenty-four students still argue that Kyrgyz people should keep celebrating 
these rituals and that they should protect these rituals from people who want to eradicate them. 
It also interesting to see that many of the students that support the pre-Islamic traditions would 
admit that they know that they are not Islamic traditions and that Islamic texts are actually 
prohibiting this. The fact that these rituals have a shamanistic or Tengriist nature is not a 
problem for them. As many of them argue, the fact that they are part of Kyrgyz tradition is an 
important reason to keep practicing them. Mariam and Azia, for example, admit that they know 
that Nooruz is not an Islamic holiday, but they both believe that Nooruz is a celebration that 
unifies the nation and that function as an event to remember Kyrgyz tradition. According to 
Ainura: 
 
45 
‘I think that our traditions are not really Islamic. The burning of the juniper is not Islamic. 
My grandmother is going to mazars and to healers and fortune tellers, but this not 
Islamic. Still I think that we should not change I, but keep it. These rituals are important 
parts of our tradition’. 
At the same time, while two respondents did not mention pre-Islamic rituals in their answers, 
nine of the twenty-four respondents believed that these pre-Islamic rituals are wrong and that 
they therefore should not be practiced by Muslims in Kyrgyzstan. Although the examples 
mentioned above show that the majority of the students share the government’s perspective 
on pre-Islamic rituals, this shows that there is still a significant number of students who deviate 
from government discourse on the topic of pre-Islamic rituals. According to them, these rituals 
have shamanistic origins and they therefore argue Islam prohibits the practice of these ritual. 
Sultan, for example, voices that: 
‘I see that some people are combining traditions, but I don’t think that you can combine 
these traditions with Islam. You must choose between the two. Or follow Islam, of 
choose the traditions’. 
According to students, the fact that people practice these rituals is that they don’t have enough 
knowledge about Islam or because they misunderstand the rules of Islam. Keres, Anara, 
Chingiz and Jyrgyal all argue that people should learn more about Islam in order to know which 
practices people can do according to Islamic rules. For Jyrgyal, the fact that she learned more 
about Islam from external sources led her to think differently about her own traditions. This 
also led to a situation where she differentiates herself from the form of Islam that her parents 
practice. She says: 
‘My mother goes to these fortune tellers, and she also does this stuff to me. I say to 
my mother: I don’t like this stuff. You have to stick to one God and not go to these 
other places to worship other things’. 
While some students are, similar to Jyrgal, willing to confront their family members and friends 
on things that they consider as contradicting Islam, other students have been outspoken 
against pre-Islamic rituals but are still also quite acceptive of practices that their friends and 
family members do. According to them, it is a personal choice to reject the traditions and to 
choose for a cleaner form of Islam. Chingiz rejects pre-Islamic rituals but also argues that it ‘if 
people want to celebrate it, it is their own choice’. Anara believes that it is not wrong to visit 
mazars as long as it is not contradicting Islam. In this, both students make a clear distinction 
between traditions and shamanistic rituals, but also try to balance between the two sides.  
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6.6 Conclusion  
Concluding from the points that were discussed in this chapter, there are few important 
observations that can be made. First, it is very interesting to see that half of the students 
express the desire to learn more about Islam through external sources. Although some of these 
students portray themselves as Muslims that are not religious, they still express the desire to 
learn more about Islam and to search for more knowledge. It is also interesting to see that 
Chubak azhy Zhalilov was mentioned by a large number of students as one of the most 
important sources. Although he made some controversial remarks, students are apparently 
still willing to listen to him, which shows that he has considerable influence among different 
parts of the society. In this way, both foreign as domestic preachers can thus pose threat to 
the form of Islam that the government promotes. Second, the fact the majority of students are 
questioning the linkage between ethno-national identity and Muslimness means that the 
majority of students are reconstructing their Islamic identity as a ‘faith-oriented identity’. Similar 
to what Borbieva (2009) and McBrien (2017) argue, these students are no longer convinced 
that they are Muslim-by-birth but they argue that Muslimness is a personal choice, which is 
based on believing and practice. In this process, a deviation from government discourse can 
be identified but also a difference with the perception of Muslimness by the older generation. 
The examples in this chapter therefore show how external sources can contribute to a 
generational difference. Third, although a majority of the students argue that pre-Islamic rituals 
should be protected, a significant number of students are convinced that this is contradicting 
Islam. Although it is difficult to analyze the influence of external sources, this shows that the 
discourse of foreign groups and other interpretations of Islam are visible in the remarks by 
students. Although this does not mean that students are fully rejecting the notion of Islam that 
the government promotes, it does show that students are influenced by new ideas about Islam 
that are contradicting state discourse. In this way, by using the concepts of Borbieva and 
McBrien, this chapter demonstrates that Kyrgyz students are not only influenced by 
government discourse but also by external discourses. In this process, they are balancing 
between their Kyrgyz identity and Islamic identity and constantly reconstructing their Islamic 
identity on the basis of multiple interpretations.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis focused on the central question: do the perceptions of students align with 
arguments in state discourse regarding the role of Islam in contemporary Kyrgyzstan?  Based 
on analysis of government discourse from a top-down perspective and a bottom-up 
perspective, this thesis concludes that perceptions of the majority of students that are 
interviewed in this research are aligning with major themes in government discourse. In this 
way, most students are perceiving the role of Islam and the role of the government in a similar 
manner as government discourse portrays it to be. However, as this final chapter will conclude, 
students are also influenced by ideas that are promoted by external discourses, which 
influences them to reconstruct their Islamic identity in a different way that government 
discourse does.  
Similar to the approach of other Central Asian states, Islam has been the dominant religion in 
Kyrgyzstan for many centuries which makes it easier for the state to use it as part of their policy 
to promote an ethno-national identity. For many Kyrgyz, their Islamic identity is inseparably 
connected with their Kyrgyz identity due to the fact that local norms and values are 
incorporated in Islamic tradition. As analysis of state discourse has shown, the Kyrgyz state is 
using these ‘folkloristic’ parts of the Islamic tradition in Kyrgyzstan to promote a typically 
‘Kyrgyz’ form of Islam. By emphasizing the traditional and historical connection between 
Kyrgyz traditions and Islam, the state instrumentalizes Islam as a tool in national-building 
project and boosts the role of the Kyrgyz state in safeguarding Islam against foreign threats. 
The four themes that are identified in state policy and state narrative clearly support this goal 
by propagandizing ‘traditional Kyrgyz Islam’, by condemning foreign forms of Islam and 
legitimizing government policies in the religious sphere. Moreover, by closer looking at the way 
that state discourse promotes Kyrgyz Islam and applies a ‘discourse of danger’, it can 
additionally also be argued that the state decides which practices are ‘correct’ and which 
practices should be abandoned. By offering ‘correct’ religious knowledge and monitoring 
Islamic clergy and Islamic organization, the state tries to protect moderate, apolitical forms of 
Islam from the influences from ‘extremist’, foreign forms of Islam. In this way, analysis of state 
discourse shows that the secular Kyrgyz Republic is not only promoting Islam but actually 
positioning itself as a religious authority that can protect Kyrgyz Islam that is based on the 
Hanafi school of Islam.  
This same process of the instrumentalization of Islam is also visible in the approach of religion 
in other Central Asian states. What is unique for Kyrgyzstan however is that it is always been 
quite tolerant towards new religious movements and to the influx of new religious ideas. By 
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stimulating a ‘marketplace of ideas’, Kyrgyzstan was historically a place where there was 
opportunity for new religious ideas to be introduced. External discourses from transnational 
Islamic movements have led to more Islamic knowledge and a renewed interest in Islam 
among the Kyrgyzstani population and influences from foreign forms of Islam have contributed 
to the rise in popularity of Islamic clothing and Islamic practices. As several scholars argue, 
there is currently a revival of Islamic practices and ideas, which also leads to discussions about 
Islamic ideas in the public sphere (Montgomery, 2016; McBrien, 2017). In this process, multiple 
sources and religious authorities are voicing contradicting discourses that relate to topics 
around Kyrgyz traditions, religious identity and national identity. Local traditions are, in this way, 
questioned about their compatibly with Islamic rules and Kyrgyz Muslims are challenged to 
rethink their Islamic identity and the way that they practice religious traditions. This means that 
the notion of Islam in state discourse is also being challenged by external discourses and thus 
also pose threat to the state in their position as religious authority. For Kyrgyzstani citizens, 
these new ideas can be disorienting since they not only introduce new ideas about Islam but 
also introduce new demands for the construction of an Islamic identity.  
Practically all of the students that are interviewed in this research identify the influence of 
foreign Islam on the religious sphere and the Islamization that is taking place in Kyrgyzstan. 
They acknowledge the fact that the role Islam has rapidly grown in the last five years. Many of 
them underline the fact that especially the young generation is becoming more interested in 
Islam and that an Islamic identity is promoted as ‘trendy’. Although there could be several 
factors that could explain this observation, this acknowledgement lines up with what the 
argument of scholars that write that the young generation is becoming increasingly religious 
(Myrzabekova, 2014; Montgomery, 2016, McBrien, 2017). This also confirms the importance 
to interview the young generation about their view of the role of Islam in Kyrgyz society and 
their opinion about contemporary developments in the religious sphere.  
By comparing the four themes that were mentioned in state discourse with the arguments that 
respondents provided during interviews, this thesis identified two major perspectives in the 
students’ view of the role of Islam in contemporary society. The first perspective aligns with the 
arguments that are mentioned in government discourse and show how a majority of students 
are acknowledging the importance of a ‘traditional Kyrgyz Islam’ and unique position of the 
secular state to safeguard this particular form of Islam. In this perspective, the majority of 
students align with the government discourse on the topic of traditional Kyrgyz Islam, religious 
clothing, religious extremism and religious education. Similar to state discourse, the majority 
of students view the influences of foreign Islam as potential threats that could only be 
contaminated by government control of religious affairs. This is important to recognize, since 
it shows that students rely on the government to control and police public Islam in Kyrgyzstan. 
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In their view on contemporary religious affairs, students use the same arguments as the 
‘discourse of danger’ that the government promotes in state discourse. Although this thesis 
cannot proof that respondents are directly or indirectly influenced by state discourse, the points 
that are mentioned above show that a majority of the respondents reflect the main arguments 
in government approach towards Islam. This means that the students’ perceptions of Islam for 
the most part echo state discourse.  
The second perspective of respondents, however, reflect that students are reconstructing their 
Islamic identity and are adapting interpretations of Islam that are different then the form Islam 
that state discourse promotes. It is interesting to see that half of the students are expressing 
the desire to learn more about Islam and that a large number of students are learning from 
sources that are deemed unfit by government discourse. This means that there is a potential 
that students are influenced by external sources in their adaption of new interpretations of 
Islam, which is also a development that is voiced by scholars (Borbieva, 2009; Montgomery, 
2016). New interpretations of Islam have led to discussions between Kyrgyz Muslims about 
the question on what ‘right Islam’ is. Using the framework of McBrien (2017), this thesis shows 
that the majority of respondents are gradually viewing their Islamic identity as a ‘faith oriented 
identity’ that is based on believing instead of building their identity on the ethno-national 
belonging. As previously argued, this does not mean that students are rejection the strong 
connection between Kyrgyz national tradition and Islam, as is promoted in state discourse, but 
it does show that students are starting to believe that an Islamic lifestyle involves a personal 
choice and commitment. This same factor is also visible in the fact that a number of students 
are questioning the compatibly between Islamic rules and Kyrgyz traditions. Students consider 
Kyrgyz traditions as important parts of their national identity, as long as they not contradict 
Islamic rules.  
To conclude, this thesis shows that the importance of Islam is not going to diminish in the next 
few years. In contrary, the influence of external discourses and the instrumentalization of Islam 
by the government demonstrates that the number of discussions about Islam will only increase. 
This thesis argues that a majority of students are concerned about the fact that a growing 
number of people is starting to radicalize, and they therefore support the government in 
controlling and policing religious practices.  The notion of ‘traditional Kyrgyz Islam and the topic 
of radicalism and extremism therefore proves to be valuable tools for the Kyrgyzstani 
government to justify their actions against religious groups to protect Kyrgyz Islam. However, 
external discourses promote different interpretations of Islam which leads to students 
constantly balancing between different perceptions about the significance of their Islamic 
identity and the notion of Kyrgyz Islam. Therefore, the theory of ‘balanced existence’ that Maria 
Louw (2013) proposes in her work about Islamic identity in Kyrgyzstan, applies to this specific 
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case. At the one hand, students echo the narrative of ‘Islam as a threat’ that is dominant in 
state discourse but at the other hand they also acknowledge their desire to learn more from 
external discourse and their process of reconstructing their Islamic identity. Only time can tell 
if the Kyrgyz government can continue to successfully mobilize Islam to strengthen a Kyrgyz 
identity and national unity, or if external discourse will eventually break down the authoritative 
position of the Kyrgyz government.  
The research for this thesis only focused on state discourse and field research among students 
in Bishkek. Further research must therefore be conducted to provide more understanding and 
different insights. First, it would be interesting to further research the influence of external 
discourses and to provide a better understanding of the ideas that these discourses spread. In 
this way, better comparisons between state discourse and external discourses can be made. 
Secondly, since all field research was conducted in Bishkek, further research should be done 
in other parts of Kyrgyzstan. Respondents in the south of Kyrgyzstan could provide different 
examples then respondents in the north. Moreover, since Bishkek represents an urban 
environment, it is also recommended to interview respondents from smaller villages. Thirdly, 
this research only focused on ethnic Kyrgyz students that are Muslim. Another interesting 
factor could be to include representatives from different ethnic groups, such as the Uzbeks, 
Uyguyrs or Dungans and other religious groups, such as Christians, Buddhists etc. Finally, 
since this thesis only focused on students, it would be valuable to include the older generation 
in the research and to compare between the perceptions of the older generation and the 
younger generation to provide a better picture of the role of Islam in Kyrgyzstan.  
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Appendix  
 
Respondent Alias  Sex Age  Place of 
origin 
University Programme 
1.  Aibek Male 18  Jalal-
Abad 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
Academy of 
music 
2.  Bermet Female 18 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
International 
Relations 
3.  Gulnara Female 19 Issyk-Kul 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
Translation 
Studies 
4.  Anara Female  22 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
Islamic 
Theology 
5.  Aziza Female  18 Jalal-
Abad 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
English 
Language and 
Literature.  
6.  Kauhar Female  18 Osh 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
English 
Language and 
Literature. 
7.  Karina Female 19 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz-
Turkish 
Manas 
University 
International 
Relations 
8.  Jyrgal Female 18 Bishkek 
region 
Ala-too 
International 
University 
Finance and 
Credit 
9.  Nazgul Female 22 Talas 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
Journalism and 
Mass 
Communication 
10.  Chingiz Male  18 Osh 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
Software 
Engineering 
11.  Jamiliya Female 20 Bishkek 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
International 
Business Law 
12.  Saikal Female  22  Issyk-Kul 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
Journalism and 
Mass 
Communication 
13.  Emil Male 22 Talas 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
International 
Business Law 
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14.  Baktigul Female 21 Talas 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
International 
Business Law 
15.  Keres Female 21 Jalal-
Abad 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
International 
and 
Comparative 
Politics 
16.  Fatima Female 21 Osh 
region 
American 
University of 
Central Asia 
International 
and 
Comparative 
Politics 
17. Aisulu Female 20 Batken 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
German 
Linguistics 
18. Sultan Male 19 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
International 
Relations 
19. Alima Female 19 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
International 
Relations 
20.  Benoka Female 19 Jalal-
Abad 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
International 
Relations 
21. Macha Female 20 Batken 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
Marketing 
22.  Mairam Female 20 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
International 
Relations 
23.  Ainura Female 19 Bishkek 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
Journalism 
24.  Timurbek Male 19 Talas 
region 
Kyrgyz 
National 
University 
Computer 
programming 
 
 
 
 
